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Introduction
Thirty years ago, in the same year that witnessed pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen
Square and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first email that marked the birth of the internet was
easily overshadowed. In 1989, approximately 500,000 users were connected through MCI Mail
and CompuServe email servers. Later in that same year, Tim Berners-Lee and his team at CERN
invented the World Wide Web, but it was not open to public use until 1991 (Waring, 2018). As
of January 2019, the total number of internet users across the world reached 4.39 billion, more
than half of the world’s total population (Kemp, 2019).1 The impact the internet and other digital
technologies have on the lives of those who have access to them cannot be overstated; nearly
every facet of the daily lives of individuals, corporations, and governments are affected.
One such area of society that has been empowered by the internet is human rights. The
internet and digital technologies allow for the recognition, advocation, and protection of human
rights. People around the world have access to faster and exponentially more information than
ever before. The possibilities for education, politics, healthcare, work and equality have greatly
expanded. The internet provides new opportunities for the progression of humanity, but not
without a cost.
Last year in Shanghai, Dong Yaoqiong livestreamed herself throwing black paint on a
poster of Chinese President Xi Jinping in an act of protest against him and the Chinese
Community Party. Within hours police were at her door and she has not been heard from since
(Ma, 2018). In 2017, the German police orchestrated a coordinated raid in all but two of its
states. The homes of 36 individuals accused of posting alleged hateful and extremist content on
social media were raided (Shimer, 2017). Maria Motuznaya, 23-years old, was placed on
Russia’s official list of extremists and terrorists after memes she posted on her social media
account when she was 20 years old resurfaced. She faced up to six years in prison as a result
(Robinson, 2018). While reporting on and livestreaming a demonstration by immigration
activists in Memphis, Tennessee, journalist Manuel Duran was arrested and placed in
Immigration & Custom Enforcement (ICE) custody. After having all criminal charges dropped in
court, Duran was immediately detained by ICE (U.S. Press Freedom Tracker, 2018).
The transformative power of the internet to both empower and infringe on human rights
has not been lost on states. As a relatively new domain, the policies in cyberspace remain in their
trial periods. Each state is implementing, redacting, and implementing again policies affecting
their citizens’ rights in order to strike a balance between national security and collective and
individual rights. Several influential leaders in cyberspace have emerged for different reasons:
the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union. Although the European Union can be
considered a state actor, rather than a political system, because of the trait of shared sovereignty,
this thesis will use Germany as a case study for reasons of consistency, equal level analysis, and
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However, despite claims in 2013 by Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt that everybody in the world
would be connected to the internet by 2020 (Gross, 2013), a substantial portion of the global population
remains unconnected. In 2016, 90 percent of the population that does not have access to the internet are in
developing countries, highlighting the issue of disproportionate modernization across regions.
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due to the arguably hegemonic role of Germany in the European Union (Paterson, 2011;
Kornelius 2010, Schönberger, 2012).2
Each state places various degrees of emphasis on human rights affected by the internet.
On one end of the spectrum, Germany aims to protect its citizens’ data and privacy, while on the
opposite end China enforces stringent censorship. The United States and Russia fall somewhere
in between. Regarding the nature of this research, and the often-secretive nature of states’
domestic cyber policies, an acknowledgement must first be made in the difficulty to accurately
quantify the numbers and statistics of internet users and victims of internet crackdowns. An
honest effort will be made to cite primary sources from each state but will often be qualified by
state-biased think tanks and military reports.
The goal of this thesis is to provide a comparative analysis of the state of digital rights in
four states across the human rights spectrum: China, Russia, the United States, and Germany. In
order to do so, a review of literature regarding internet access as a human right will be
conducted, as well as an overview of the evolution of digital rights. Next, a brief overview of the
major domestic cyber policies and international stance of each of the four cases will be
presented. Once a clear understanding of the digital rights situation for each state is established, a
comparative analysis will be undertaken. In order to aid in the process of this analysis and
provide insight for further research, this thesis offers several hypotheses on the relationships
between government transparency and invasiveness in individual sovereignty and political
stability and likelihood of government interference in citizens’ digital rights. These are:
H1: As a state’s transparency decreases it is more likely to be invasive of its citizens’
digital rights.
H2: As a state’s transparency increases it is more likely to protect its citizens’ digital
rights.
H3: States with low levels of political stability are more likely to interfere in their citizens’
digital rights through policies that are claimed necessary to protect national security.
H4: States with high levels of political stability are more likely to implement policies to
protect their citizens’ digital rights.
Rather than simply providing an overarching analysis of the stance individual
governments have on their respective citizens’ digital rights situation, these hypotheses and their
results aim to search for a deeper correlation. As a relatively new field, the analysis of the
treatment of digital rights and the progression of policies affecting these rights in various
situations in the current world order are critical to understand how and when the current
international policy gap concerning human rights affected by the internet and digital collections
will be resolved.
This thesis will be looking at domestic policies relating to cyberspace and the internet
mostly between 1995 and 2019, unless policies prior to the internet are worth noting. This
2

This is a debatable claim (Kundnani 2012). For the purpose of this thesis, Germany will be understood as the
representative of its own policies as well as EU policies because the issue of cybersecurity is comparable to
economic and trade issues. Therefore, according to the EU charter jurisdiction, the issue of cybersecurity falls
on the union level.
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timeframe was deliberately chosen in order to provide consistency between the four case studies.
Despite the internet being publicly accessible since 1991, its accessibility in the four case studies
varies. For example, it was not until 1994 that China became officially recognized as a country
accessible to the internet (CERNIC, 2001). As is often the case with policy analysis, by the time
this thesis will be finished it would be of no surprise if new laws and policies are implemented in
each case study; however, in order to avoid ceaseless additions this thesis will only analyze
policies prior to March, 2019.
The data concerning digital rights violations for this thesis will come from Freedom
House’s annual Freedom on the Net reports for each state. In these reports an overall internet
freedom score is given to each country out of 100, where 100 is the worst and 0 is the best. This
score is a cumulation of three subsections: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violation of
users’ rights. The last of these subsections, violation of users’ rights, is of particular interest and
will be used heavily during the comparative analysis section. This score is out of 40, where 40
represents the highest volume of users’ rights violations, and 0 represents no user rights
violations. To supplement the sections relating to human rights, Transparency International and
Human Rights Watch will also be cited. The World Bank’s global governance indicators will be
used to determine a state’s transparency and political stability levels. The former will be
measured by the control of corruption governance score and the latter by the political stability
and absence of violence/terrorism score. Both of these scores fall between -2.5 to 2.5, the lower
end of this range being the worst while the upper range is the best. Finally, wherever possible an
honest effort to use primary policies in their original languages will be made for the Germany
and China sections. Where this is not possible, academic journals and news articles for these
languages will also be sought.
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Evolution of the Conceptions of Human and Digital Rights
I. SHOULD A RIGHT TO THE INTERNET EXIST?
“Given that the Internet has become an indispensable tool for realizing a range
of human rights, combating inequality, and accelerating development and human progress,
ensuring universal access to the Internet should be a priority for all States.”
(La Rue, 2011)
In June of 2011, amidst the chaos of the Arab Spring, the United Nations special
rapporteur, Frank La Rue, published a report declaring that the internet and human rights are
unquestionably intertwined. Previous declarations, charters, and conventions already
acknowledged this connection, going so far as to affirm that access to the internet is a human
right,3 but this was the first definitive assertion by the United Nations. Numerous articles quickly
took this report to mean that the United Nations considers access to the internet to be a human
right (Howell and West, 2016). However, critics soon emerged and contested this interpretation
of the report and instead used the above quote to justify, among other arguments, that the internet
is an enabler of rights, but not a right by itself.
Three main arguments emerged in the question of whether the internet constitutes a
human right. One camp argues that it is undoubtedly a right and thus states should be obligated
to provide access to it. Another argument is made that because the internet ensures the
safeguarding of natural rights it is a legal right. Lastly, there are those who say the internet is not
a human right and saying otherwise will lead to the devaluation of other rights. Yet, despite these
different interpretations there tends to be a general agreement on the role of the internet on
protecting and facilitating other human rights.
Within the last two decades an increasing number of charters, conventions, and reports
have argued that the use of the internet allows individuals to exercise various fundamental
human rights protected by the UDHR, ECHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR, including: the right to
information protected by Articles 19, 20, and 26 UDHR, the right to control access to
information protected by Article 12 UDHR, the right to privacy protected by Article 17 ICCPR
and Article 8(2) ECHR, freedom of expression protected by Article 19 UDHR, and freedom to
assemble protected by Article 20 UDHR (Mathiesen, 2014; Watt, 2017). The progression of the
recognition of the internet in protecting these established rights can be seen in Table 2.1 and
Table 2.2 where an increase in the rights associated with the internet has increased over the
years.
A. The Internet is a Human Right
Academics and practitioners classify human rights as negative or positive rights
(Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, 2007). Negative rights refer to rights that must be protected
from outside intrusion and include rights such as freedom of expression and freedom from
torture. In the context of internet access this means states would be prohibited from interfering in
or blocking citizens’ ability to connect. Positive rights refer to human rights that a state must
3

Namely courts and parliaments in both France and Estonia affirmed that internet access is a human right
(Cerf, 2012).
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provide for its citizens and is often attributed to rights such as the right to education and the right
to legal recourse. In the case of internet access, this would mean governments must ensure that
all citizens have equal access which requires a government to provide adequate infrastructure
and resources to make internet connectivity possible. As Penney (2011) noted, the “Special
Rapporteur examined Internet access rights in both senses, not only talking about people’s
freedom to access Internet content, but also state obligations to provide access to the physical
infrastructure necessary for Internet connectivity” (Penney, 2011:15). Accordingly, despite not
explicitly stating that the right to the internet is a human right, it can be assumed through this
context and a close reading of UDHR Article 19, restated here for convenience:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (G.A. Res. 217A).
The controversy begins when, in his 2011 report, La Rue explained that Article 19 “was
drafted with foresight to include and to accommodate future technological developments through
which individuals can exercise their right to freedom of expression” (La Rue, 2011). The term
that justifies this interpretation is “media.” Despite being drafted over half a century prior, La
Rue underscores that the UDHR and subsequent conventions were purposefully written in such
language so as to later incorporate more advanced means of communication. Indeed, Land
(2013) concludes that through the drafting process of the ICCPR and UDHR, media has been
confirmed to mean both the channel and the form of expression.
Semantics are important in determining the legitimacy of the right to the internet. It is
valid to say that initial human rights conventions have not aged well in the digital age. For
example, General Comment No. 16 issued in 1966 on privacy lacks explicit mention of pressing
issues, including:
banning untargeted, mass surveillance, bulk metadata collection and retention;
intelligence services/law enforcement access to communication data held by third-party
providers and internet companies including in a ‘cloud’; the relationship between private
companies and governments; biometric data gathering (through, for example, fingerprinting, facial recognition software) and transborder access to non-publicly available
data, circumventing the requirements of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. (Watt,
2017:788)
Yet, it would have been impossible to explicitly account for and anticipate all of these
issues prior to their inception. As such, it is to the discretion of UN policymakers and states in
accordance with these conventions to carefully interpret and integrate modern issues with
fundamental rights.
Article 19 of the UDHR is often used to spearhead the recognition of the internet as a
human right but it is not alone. Under Article 27 of the UDHR, individuals have a right to enjoy
their culture, religion, language and share in scientific advancements and its benefits (G.A. Res.
217A). This latter portion furthermore takes into account the foresight the original writers of the
UDHR possessed. Loss of access to information technologies, specifically the internet, would be
detrimental to the world’s most marginalized people where access to the internet directly
translated to “health, education, employment, the arts, [and] gender equality” (Edwards, 2012).
Technological progress and the fulfillment of fundamental rights, particularly freedom of
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association and expression, are inseparable. The timing of the UN special report, published
during the internet-enabled Arab Springs, further undermines the connection between access to
internet, as both a “media” described in Article 19 and a “scientific advancement” stated in
Article 27, and human rights.
Simply put: times change. Modernization and globalization aided to usher in the
Information Age through the internet. Cultures, systems of governance and technologies are all
subject to change, the latter just happened to transform incredibly fast. In order to not be left
behind, interpretations of human rights must also change to ensure the adequate protection of
human rights.
B. The Internet is a Legal Right
The internet has empowered and transformed the way in which individuals communicate
and share information. Indeed, as Powell, Byrne and Dailey (2010:163) emphasize, the internet
“has become a ‘basic requirement’ for social inclusion and economic participation,” both of
which are fundamental rights protected by the UDHR. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that
the absence of access to the internet disadvantages and excludes individuals from a modern
lifestyle and equal social opportunity, thus is arguably a human rights violation (Hammond,
1997; O'Hara and Stevens, 2006; Tully, 2014).
However, despite a general acknowledgement of the importance of the internet in
upholding human rights, even La Rue admits that “there is no right to the internet ‘as such’”
(Land, 2013:400). Upon closer inspection, while the UN report did bring just focus on the
importance of the internet in connection to human rights and calls for states to work towards
universal access to the internet, it did not explicitly state the internet is a human right. Similarly,
the UN Human Rights Council Resolution on Internet and Human Rights passed in 2012
includes the “promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet,” but does
not mention the internet as a human right (York, 2012).
After coming to this conclusion, Tomalty (2017) suggests clearly distinguishing human
rights between “legal human rights,” such as those articulated in the UDHR, ICCPR, and
ICESCR and natural rights, as in “the moral rights taken to be held by all humans simply by
virtue of being human.” Tomalty (2017:6) clarifies that the latter must be grounded in morally
relevant attributes of humanity in which the most dominate attribute is arguably that natural
rights are “grounded in fundamental interests shared by all, or at least the majority, of humans.”
This implies that natural rights are more basic and inherent to humanity, regardless of society or
era, and exemplified in the right to not be tortured and freedom from slavery. By this logic,
access to the internet, as a commercial product of humans, is not a natural right because having
access cannot be held universally by all humans simply in virtue of being human.
That is not to say that a legal right for the internet does not exist. Legal rights are social
constructs that can emerge over time, in light of technological and societal advancements. In its
most basic form, legal rights are a social construct are decided by people, not discovered
(Tomalty, 2017). Legal rights must be created in order to protect natural rights, therefore the
natural rights articulated in human rights conventions are both natural and legal, but not all legal
rights are natural. For example, UDHR Article 15 protects an individual’s right to a nationality.
Nationality is a social construct that encompasses a more fundamental human right, namely
freedom of movement which is arguably a natural right. Although both are now legal and human
rights due to their presence in legal human rights documents, only UDHR Article 13 freedom of
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movement, is a natural right. The implication of this differentiation would be domestic
implementation. If a state acknowledges a legal right to internet access without international
treaties recognizing it as a human right, this implies a state could be exempt from having to
provide internet access for all people within the country. Instead, much like the legal right to
vote, ability to exercise this right is contingent upon citizenship, age, and other factors.
As previously discussed above, access to and use of the internet involves several natural
rights including freedom of expression, association, information, and education. Although it is
possible to exercise these rights through other means, the scope of the internet and its presence in
increasingly more aspects of society necessitates its access to ensure equal opportunities. Given
the apparent enduring nature of the internet in society, it is important to recognize that the
internet is a legal right and should be protected as such.
C. The Internet is not a Human Right
The UN Special Report used the protests in the Middle East and North Africa as proof of
the transformative power of the internet to be used as a conductor for human rights such as
freedoms of expression, information, and association. Yet, mention of the internet as a human
right was starkly absent, as it should be. Vinton Cerf (2012), a co-creator of the networking
technology that made the internet possible, noted this absence in his op-ed piece in The New
York Times and concluded this was due to the understanding that “the Internet was valuable as a
means to an end, not an end in itself.” Human rights are characterized by their necessity to
maintain human dignity. It is possible to live without the internet and equating access to it to
rights that afford shelter, food, and water to individuals is wrong. In fact, access to the internet is
so intrinsically bound to already existing human rights that formalizing its recognition as a
separate right is unnecessary and could arguably dilute and threaten other rights (Tully, 2014;
Land, 2013).
The internet is undoubtedly an important means to exercise existing human rights and
therefore aids in progressing the human condition. However, access to the internet is simply an
enabler of rights, it must not pretend it is a right by itself. The speed in which technology is
changing makes predicting technological developments and how these developments will impact
civil and human rights impractical at best and impossible at worst. The international community
should be aware of this and remain cautious about “immortalizing any particular kind of
technology in international law” (Land, 2013:400).
While the internet is often praised for its ability to disseminate mass amounts of
information, this same attribute contributes to the violation of other rights. As Tully (2014:184)
aptly suggests, “it is equally apparent that Internet access and use can threaten the enjoyment of
human rights for certain groups and the potential to affront human dignity.” The Committee on
the Rights of the Child has oft been concerned with increasing access to the internet
internationally:
Estonia has been requested to assess sexual exploitation and child trafficking on the
Internet. Pornographic and other harmful material was accessible to children via the
Internet in Monaco, Croatia, Greece, Costa Rica, Norway, Micronesia and Japan.
Germany was commended for attempting to protect children from this information.
Children were exposed to racist and violent images and games through the Internet in
Luxembourg and Austria. Indeed, children were sexually abused following contact
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established on websites in Sweden and Slovenia. Internet chat rooms frequented by
children had been arbitrarily closed in South Korea. (Tully, 2014:183)
Additionally, the use of the internet to facilitate and expand human trafficking networks
and the prostitution of women has violated the rights advocated for by the Committee on
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Denmark is one such case of many (United
Nations, 1997). Recognizing access to the internet as a human right indirectly violates wellestablished basic human rights of children and women.
Philip Alston (1984:614) cautioned that “a proliferation of new rights would be much
more likely to contribute to a serious devaluation of the human rights currency than to enrich
significantly the overall coverage provided by existing rights.” Declaring access to the internet to
be a human right gives way to a valid fear of a domino effect of calls for further rights in other
technologies, the culmination of which might “dilute the protections for freedom of expression in
general” (Land, 2013:400). Each state has a hierarchy of human rights that they place importance
on. These hierarchies have led to disagreements on ideological values and the refusal to accept
legal obligation, the combination of which resulted in the division of the UDHR into the ICCPR
and ICESCR (Tolley, 1987). The addition of more rights would add unnecessary complexity and
lead to further disagreements between states about each right’s moral and legal worth. This
would not only call into question the scope of states that would accept the legal obligation of
providing and protecting internet access, it would also once more call into question the validity
of more fundamental rights. Furthermore, the fact that countries, even democracies, claim that
the internet takes a back seat to national security implies that access to it cannot be an inalienable
human right (Goel, 2019).

II. EVOLUTION OF DIGITAL RIGHTS
For the purpose of this thesis the term “digital rights” will refer to the practices that are
protected and realized by the use of digital technologies, particularly the internet. Which human
rights this definition encompasses has changed over time and is subject to further changes in the
future as technology progresses. Anticipating the threats to fundamental human rights prior to the
publicization of the internet, the Council of Europe passed the Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1981. This was the first
international convention to address the “increasing flow across frontiers of personal data
undergoing automatic processing” (Council of Europe, 2001). As shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2,
the main concern of this convention was to safeguard the right to privacy, a theme that remained
consistent throughout the years in various digital rights conventions and charters.
The 2001 Convention on Cybercrime is the first international treaty that aims to address
crime in cyberspace by harmonizing the national laws of involved countries and improving
investigative techniques (ETS No. 185, 2001). Article 15 of this convention specifically states
that the implementation and application of powers and procedures addressed in the convention
are pursuant to the obligations outlined in the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the ICCPR. Unlike the 1981
convention, there is an article within the Convention of Cybercrime that protects a right outlined
in the ICESCR, namely the rights of children.
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Table 2.1 ICCPR Articles

Right to Legal Recourse
(Article 2)

1981
Convention for
the Protection
of Individuals
with regard to
Automatic
Processing of
Personal Data
—

2001
2002
Budapest
People's
Convention Communication
on
Charter
Cybercrime

2006
APC
Internet
Rights
Charter
(revised)

2011
Charter of
Human
Rights and
Principles
for the
Internet

Article 15

Article 7

Theme 7.2

Article 18

Gender Equality
(Article 3)

—

Article 15

—

Theme 1.5

Article 2(c)

Right to Equality
Before the Law
(Article 14)

—

Article 15

Article 15

—

—

Article 12(2),
Article 11

Article 15

Article 13

Theme 5

Article 8

Freedom of Thought,
Conscience and Religion
(Article 18)

—

Article 15

—

—

Article 6

Freedom of Opinion
and Expression
(Article 19)

—

Article 15

Article 2

Theme 2, 3

Article 5

Prohibition of
Propaganda
(Article 20)

—

Article 15

Article 14

—

Article 5(e)

Right to Peaceful
Assembly
(Article 21)

—

Article 15

—

Theme 2.3

Article
5(a),6

Freedom of
Association
(Article 22)

—

Article 15

—

—

Article 6

Rights for Children
(Article 24)

—

Article 15

Article 11

—

Article 12

Right to Participate
in the Conduct of
Public Affairs
(Article 25)

—

Article 15

Article 10

—

Article 15

Rights for Minorities
(Article 27)

—

Article 15

Article 8, 9

Theme 1.9

Article 2(b)

Privacy
(Article 17)
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Table 2.2 ICESCR Articles

Gender Rights
(Article 3)

1981
Convention for
the Protection
of Individuals
with regard to
Automatic
Processing of
Personal Data
—

2001
2002
Budapest
People's
Convention Communication
on
Charter
Cybercrime

2006
APC
Internet
Rights
Charter
(revised)

2011
Charter of
Human
Rights and
Principles
for the
Internet

—

—

Theme 1.5

Article
2(c)

Right to Work
(Article 6)

—

—

—

—

Article 14

Just Work Conditions
(Article 7)

—

—

—

Theme 1.7

—

Social Security
(Article 9)

—

—

—

—

Article 4,
17

Rights for Children
(Article 10)

—

Article 9

Article 11

—

Article 12

Right to Education
(Article 13/14)

—

—

Article 5

—

Article 10

Take Part in Cultural
Life and Benefit from
Scientific Progress
(Article 15)

—

—

Article 9

Theme 4.3

Article 11

The Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention, has been
ratified by forty-nine parties, including the United States and Germany. Both of which also
ratified the ICCPR (see Table 2.3). China, which is not a signatory of the ICCPR, is also not a
signatory of this convention. Russia, however, has ratified the ICCPR but their primary objection
to the Budapest Convention has less to do with the human rights pursuant to the ICCPR and
more to do with the allowance for “unilateral trans-border access of data by law enforcement
agencies of one country without notifying the authorities in another county, thus…violating state
sovereignty” (Barmin et al., 2011:74).
The remaining three categories listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are charters aimed to expand
the scope of digital rights and bring awareness to policy-makers on the domestic and
international levels. Each charter specifically states that access to the internet/cyberspace is a
human right. Indeed, this movement has led Estonia, Finland, and Costa Rica to recognize
internet access as a human right (Tully, 2014). Furthermore, a 2012 Global Internet User Survey
found that eighty-six percent of internet users agreed or strongly agreed that the internet should
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be considered a basic human right (Internet Society, 2012). Yet, despite progress at the
individual and national levels, international organizations and treaties have yet to definitively
make this leap.
Table 2.3 Signatory Statuses
State
China
Russia
United Sates
Germany

ICCPR

ICESCR

Signed
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified

Ratified
Ratified
Signed
Ratified

Right to the
Internet
Not Recognized
Not Recognized
Not Recognized
Not Recognized

Source: (Neumayer, 2007)
As demonstrated in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, in the earlier years of digital rights there was an
emphasis on the relationship between the internet and the rights afforded by the ICCPR.
However, starting in the twenty-first century as the demand for digital rights grew charters and
conventions began to expand which rights are deemed related to cyberspace and the internet. In
the case of the rights outlined in the ICCPR, the right to privacy has consistently remained a key
component of digital rights. Similarly, minority rights (Article 27), freedom of expression
(Article 19), and right to legal recourse (Article 2) are also repeatedly emphasized. Additionally,
with each new charter increasingly more rights under both the ICCPR and the ICESCR are
specifically named to warrant additional protections.
Similarly, the rights afforded by the ICESCR have been increasingly incorporated in
digital rights charters and conventions over time. Although not initially seen as related to digital
rights, the last decade has seen the expansion of the scope of human rights considered to be
digital rights. Most notably, the right to take part in cultural life and benefit from scientific
progress (Article 15) and the rights of children (Article 10) are repeatedly recognized by digital
rights charters.
As noted above, the division of digital rights along ICCPR and ICESCR lines may help to
provide insight in their acceptance or rejection by states and subsequently international
organizations. The incorporation of more ICESCR rights may aid in the acceptance of future
cyber conventions by states which ratified the ICESCR. A government’s view on digital rights
may influence its domestic cyber policies and willingness to ratify international treaties. Yet, as
seen in the case of Russia in the Budapest Convention, this is not absolute. Regardless, the
expansion of digital rights showcases the growing influence of technology on almost every facet
of society.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CYBER FREEDOM AND SECURITY
The level of importance placed on human rights on the international and national levels is
directly related to the dominant ideologies of the world order and specific state contexts in which
it exists. The current world order was forged from the aftermath of the Cold War which saw the
United States as the unequivocal world hegemon. The American preponderance of power
ensured that the liberal international organizations created during that time, and to some extent
continue to be, a reflection of American liberal values. During this time, liberalism was the
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dominant theory in international relations because it happened to be the ideology of the most
powerful state at the time (Sterling-Folker, 2015). This sentiment carried on throughout the
1990s which saw a drastic increase in the number of international organizations and
preponderance of liberal values, including the importance of human rights.4 This can also be seen
by the expansion of digital rights as norms, consistent with constructivist theories. Thus, the
acceptance of digital rights as a norm is contingent upon the attitudes towards liberal values in a
world order. If the norm is not sufficiently spread and accepted before a shift in the world order
then that may hamper its legitimacy and strength, a situation that is now unfolding in China,
Russia, and even democracies like India (Goel, 2019).
Although the post-Cold War world was best described as a liberal one, some theorists
argue that liberal theory was hard-pressed to accurately explain it (Gleditsch, 2008). This critique
also extends to the seeming degeneration of the liberal order today. The importance placed on
liberal ideological values that advocated for the protection of individual sovereignty in order to
benefit society are diminishing in a global society where emerging actors are not liberal or even
democratic. The golden years of global governance are gone, replaced now with fragmented
international organizations and gridlock on decisions of transnational issues, cybersecurity being
one of them (Stephen, 2017). The emerging non-liberal, non-democratic powers—China being
the most notable, but Russia should not be overlooked—do not subscribe to the liberal
ideological characteristics of global governance, even if they do benefit from the existence of
these institutions (Zhang, 2016). Yet, this does not mean the end of global governance
necessarily. As explained by Stephen (2017), global governance may still occur but without the
dissemination of liberal values.
Whether global governance without the promise of the protection of liberal values like
human rights will result in rules and institutions that can effectively tackle the complex
transnational issues of cybersecurity and human rights is unclear. In order to solve the global
challenge of cybersecurity a “hardheaded assessment of which players really matter in getting to
an acceptable answer and a process of bargaining to get them aligned” is required (Barma,
Ratner and Weber, 2012:66). Yet, the range of perspectives on this issue at the national level
between powerful states are diverse and often rooted in a state’s hierarchy of human rights.
Therefore, to expect a consensus to be drawn in a world order where emerging actors do not
champion traditional liberal norms is ill-timed.5 However, as Deudney and Ikenberry (2018)
suggest, liberal democracies are remarkably robust and have faced and recovered from worse.
They would advocate that if a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy is accomplished,
then institutional innovations may emerge to adapt and respond to global challenges.
Despite previous interstate demonstrations of cyber capabilities, many nations did not
view cybersecurity as a top priority national security until 2001. Days following the September
11th attacks the Federal Bureau of Investigation warned of further possible attacks, including
cyber terrorism (Spencer, 2002). The issue of cybersecurity then took on a different hue and
debates ensued on the capabilities of cyberwarfare; would it equate to mass destruction,
4

Whether these institutions and the order of this time were truly liberal is debated (Barma, Ratner and Weber,
2012).
5 In 1998, fearing that information weapons would be on the same scale as weapons of mass destruction,
Russia promoted a proposal to the UN to restrict what states can do with cyber weapons but was curtailed by
the United States (Barmin et al., 2011). Even in the golden years of global governance and liberal values
progress was not made on tackling cybersecurity which seems to suggest that Barma, Ratner, and Weber
(2012) were right in their analysis.
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trademarked by direct physical damage on infrastructure resulting in civilian casualties, or mass
disruption, defined as the ability to change, delay, delete or redirect data in order to cause
economic, social or political disorder. The last decade has witnessed sufficient proof for the case
of mass disruption in the forms of the 2007 Estonian cyberattacks that resulted in the sporadic
take down of banking systems, government communication, and media outlets and more recently
the 2016 Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee and other democratic
organizations (McGuinness, 2017; Diamond, 2016). However, although no cyberattack to date
has resulted in the loss of life, political theorists like Deudney and Ikenberry (2018) are confident
in the mass destruction capabilities of cyberwarfare—a claim that can be supported by the 2010
Stuxnet computer worm which is known as the first cyberattack to cause physical damage across
international borders (Lindsay, 2013). Considering the current rapid pace of cyberspace
potential, the next decade will be crucial in setting international norms. Although it is unlikely
that a return to liberal fundamentals will reach the same level of international priority,
deliberation, and collaboration as it did in the second half of the twentieth century within this
timeframe, it is possible that the fear of the potential of cyberwarfare will bring all states to the
negotiating table.
On the national level, the fear generated by the possibility of a cheaper and more
accessible weapon of mass destruction could help to justify some states’ domestic cyber policies.
Yet, this excuse could be used in order to justify limits on human rights related to the internet
when in actuality a state’s domestic cyber policies are implemented to maintain political
stability. This theme will be explored in later sections. Regardless, according to Keohane (2002),
a government’s first task is to protect their people, thus policies that prioritize national security
over individual sovereignty are acceptable. Furthermore, an argument can be made that
modernized states are the most vulnerable to cyberattacks due to a reliance on technology to
sustain fundamental systems like infrastructure and power grids which provides both economic
and social stability to a state. For these reasons, it is not surprising that some emerging states,
and even the United States, sometimes subscribe to domestic policies that place national security
over citizens’ derogable human rights. However, this alone does not explain the approach of
some modern regional powers. For example, Germany and other western European countries
have implemented domestic policies that serve to protect digital rights. The hypotheses provided
in the former section of this thesis will attempt to explain this divergence, that is the existence
and protection of these practices as rights relates to levels of transparency and political stability
in a state.
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China
I. DOMESTIC CYBER POLICIES
“As in the real world, freedom and order are both necessary in cyberspace: Freedom is what
order is meant for, and order is the guarantee for freedom. We should respect internet users’
rights to exchange ideas and express their minds and we should also build good order in
cyberspace in accordance with [the] law as it will help protect the legitimate rights and interests
of all internet users” (Phillips, 2015).
-President Xi Jinping at the Opening Ceremony of the Second World Internet Conference, 2015.

China registered to become the 71st country on the global computer network and received
CN as the “highest level domain name” in 1994, however it was not until January of 1995 that
the 64K special lines were put into operation that internet access services began to be offered to
the public (Shahbaz, 2018; Cnnic.com.cn, 2012). China experienced unprecedented expansion of
internet use after realizing “the significance of computer information in its economic
development and encouraged fast development of Internet in commercial use to embrace the new
information era” (Liang and Lu, 2010:104-105). An indication of this tremendous expansion is
the increase of internet users over the years. The Chinese Internet Network Information Center
(CNNIC) reported approximately two million users in 1998, more than 100 million in 2005, and
surpassed 298 million by the end of 2008, exceeding the number of internet users in the United
States (Liang and Lu, 2010). As of December 2017, the total number of internet users in China
reached 771.98 million (Statista, 2017).
With such a massive internet user base, the effect of cyber policies is especially
imperative to widespread human rights violations or protections. In the case of China, internet
development accompanied “the government’s tight control and regulation over Internet
infrastructure, its commercial and social use, and its potential political ramifications” (Liang and
Lu, 2010:104). Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution gives citizens of the People’s Republic of
China freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration (CHINA,
1983). Yet, media regulations undermine these rights by allowing authorities to crack down on
news stories that “expose state secrets and endanger the country” (Xu and Albert, 2017). Indeed,
the protection of national sovereignty is regularly used as an argument to censor information
deemed harmful to Chinese political or economic interests and surveil and punish both citizens
within and outside the country, as well as foreign journalists, activists, and NGOs inside of
mainland China. In fact, China is regularly reported as the worst abuser of internet freedom
according to Freedom House (Shahbaz, 2018).
Various laws/regulations (see Table 3.1) outline under what conditions different online
activities and information are deemed illegal. The culmination of these conditions, as stated in
Article 19 of the Provisions on the Administration of Internet New Information Services
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005), are the following:
(1) violating the basic principles as they are confirmed in the Constitution;
(2) jeopardizing the security of the nation, divulging state secrets, subverting of the
national regime or jeopardizing the integrity of the nation’s unity;
(3) harming the honor of the interests of the nation;
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(4) inciting hatred against peoples, racism against peoples, or disrupting the solidarity of
peoples;
(5) disrupting national policies on religion, propagating evil cults and feudal
superstitions;
(6) spreading rumors, disturbing social order, or disrupting social stability;
(7) spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, terror, or abetting the
commission of a crime;
(8) insulting or defaming third parties, infringing on the legal rights and interests of
third parties;
(9) inciting illegal assemblies, associations, marches, demonstrations, or gatherings that
disturb social order;
(10) conducting activities in the name of an illegal civil organization; and
(11) any other content prohibited by law or rules.
These conditions either directly relate to or are the foundation that results in policies that
both violate and protect multiple digital rights. On one hand, these conditions seem to ensure the
protection of various rights like minority rights (4) and the rights of children (7). Regarding the
former, this condition seems to imply that citizens may not directly inflame racism or hatred
against peoples. However, this does not hold true for state-sponsored racist policies like the
detainment of over an estimated one million Uighurs in Xinjiang province. Furthermore, an
argument can be made that this condition does not have the fifty-five recognized minority groups
in mind, but rather is equally applicable against minorities in order to protect the Han majority.
Alternatively, the majority of these conditions allow for the violation of freedom of expression
(2, 6), freedom of privacy (2,3) which affects the right to information, freedom of religion (5),
freedom of association (9), freedom of assembly (9), and the right to political participation
(1,6,10). Policies use these conditions as guidelines which legalizes varying degrees of state
surveillance and censorship.
However, prior to these conditions a national project was already underway to protect the
state from the feared democratic influence of the internet. In 1998, the Golden Shield Project,
now more commonly known as the Great Firewall of China, was launched by the Ministry of
Public Security. What has been referred to as the world’s largest firewall is a combined
censorship and surveillance project that utilizes firewalls, internet registration, keyword filtering,
bandwidth throttling, and government controls on website access in order to establish a cyber
boundary around the Chinese internet (Qiu, 2000; Xu and Albert, 2017; Whiting, 2008). The
main function of this ongoing project is to censor and control information on the internet on both
the domestic and global level (Dowell, 2006). Despite previously being relatively easy to
circumvent through the use of virtual private networks (VPN), Freedom House reported in their
2018 Freedom on the Net report that “the [Chinese] government took new measures to restrict
the use of circumvention tools to bypass blocking and filtering; Apple complied by removing
hundreds of virtual private network services from its online app store” (Freedom House, 2018a).
Even foreign companies operating within mainland China are conceding to recent pressure to
stop aiding in the circumvention of domestic cyber policies that restrict digital rights.
The level of online censorship and surveillance, although consistently among the strictest
worldwide, has fluctuated over the years. This is in part due to the often vague nature of the
legislature which allows for quick changes in policies and different interpretations. Internet users
and business owners are particularly vulnerable to this legislative breadth and vigor which holds
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them in “constant fear and therefore strengthens their self-censorship” (Liang and Lu, 2010:109).
A possible cause for what Council of Foreign Affairs Senior Fellow Elizabeth C. Economy calls
a state of “schizophrenia” in regard to Chinese media policy could be the realization that China
needs to allow citizens to enjoy some freedom of press, but fears the repercussions which may
lead to a demand for more rights (Xu and Albert, 2017). The most recent show of the fluctuation
of online control has occurred since President Xi Jinping came into power. Under the now
permanent rule of President Xi, “censorship of all forms of media has tightened” (Xu and Albert,
2017). This is best exemplified by two new major domestic policies that went into effect in 2017:
the Cybersecurity Law and the National Intelligence Law (see Table 3.1). The former drastically
strengthens online censorship and is the “latest step in China’s long-term campaign for
jurisdictional control over content on the internet” (Wagner, 2017). Although this idea of internet
sovereignty, defined as the principle that states should have complete control over the internet
within their domain, formally dates back to the 2010 government white papers and long-running
projects like the Golden Shield project, it is now being reinvigorated and fortified. Since this law
came into effect, censorship activity increased by over 40 percent between 2016 and 2017
(Patrick and Feng, 2018). WeChat, a Chinese multi-purpose application with over one billion
active users, has seen an increase in arrests since the Cybersecurity Law came into effect (Jao,
2018). In fact, individuals within mainland China have been arrested for the content of their
private messages in WeChat (Dou, 2017). The latter of these laws, although characterized as
defensive, is seen by others as an offensive obligation to participate in surveillance, and thus
consequently increases censorship. This is done through Article 7 which states that “any
organization or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work according
to law” (Girard, 2019). An average of nearly one new directive every two days has followed in
the wake of these two laws in order to further “fine-tune” the dos and do nots of online activity
(Shahbaz, 2018).
With new directives and regulations comes the potential for further effects on human
rights. A current nationwide project called the Social Credit System (SCS) is a result of
increasing surveillance. Described by author Luo Peixin (2018:3) in Social Credit Law:
Principles, Rules and Cases, the SCS is “a management system that takes big data as its basis, is
supported by technological capacities, and is back by law; it is an important modern method to
forward the country’s governance systems and management capabilities.” Construction plans for
the SCS were first announced in 2014 and is planned to launch a full roll out in 2020 (Hatton,
2015). This system accounts for citizens’ on and offline behaviors and rates their trustworthiness
which then determines what opportunities, or lack thereof, a citizen has in life. For example,
those with bad ratings may be banned from air and rail travel and those with good ratings may
benefit from waived deposits at hotels and expedited security access (Shahbaz, 2018). In addition
to violations of privacy and expression, the SCS has also been accused of violating the right to
movement, thus expanding the scope of human rights affected by internet policies.
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Table 3.1 China Major Laws and Regulations
Law/Regulation
Criminal Law of the
People’s Republic of
China
Measures on the
Administration of Security
Protection of the
International Networking of
Computer Information
Networks

Date
Purpose
Promulgated
March 1997 Outlines what constitutes a crime by category of
endangerment of national security, endangerment of
public security, and disruption of the socialist market
economy. Later amendments criminalize cybercrimes.
Strengthens the security protection of the international
December
networking of information networks and maintains public
1997
order and social stability by outlining what online
activities are banned by use of international networking.

Measures on the
Administration of Internet
Information Services

September
2000

Regulates Internet information services activities by
requiring internet information services to obtain a patent
through the government to provide services.

Regulations on
Telecommunications of the
People’s Republic of China

September
2000

Regulates the order of the telecommunications market and
extends prior regulations to include voice, text, data,
images and any other information using wire or wireless
systems.

Provisions on the
Administration of Electronic
Bulletin Services via the
Internet

November
2000

Regulates the content, retention period, and genre of
electronic bulletin services.

Decision of the National
People’s Congress Standing
Committee on Safeguarding
Internet Security

December
2000

Defines how the internet should be used in order to
promote a healthy development of China’s interests.

Provisions on the
Administration of ForeignInvested
Telecommunications
Enterprises
Provisions on the
Administration of Internet
News Information Services

December
2001

Requires partially foreign-invested and foreign enterprises
to follow national laws/regulations to conduct business in
China.

September
2005

Cybersecurity Law

June 2017

Regulates Internet news information services in a way to
safeguard national security and the public interest. No
foreign-invested or wholly foreign news venture can
establish an Internet news information service.
Centralizes internet policy and obliges internet companies
operating in China to censor users’ content, restricts
online anonymity, and localizes personal data in China.

National Intelligence Law

July 2017

Obliges individuals, organizations, and institutions to
assist Public Security and State Security officials by
spying and reporting on each other. Gives the Chinese
government access to any data on social media.

Sources: (Amnesty International 2018; Girard, 2018; Shahbaz, 2018; [NPC Standing
Committee, 2000; Freedom House, 2018a)
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II. INTERNATIONAL STANCE
Freedom and order, while seemingly at odds in realist and liberal theoretical frameworks
in international relations, have a symbiotic relationship in the eyes of the Chinese government on
both the national and international level. As Zhang discusses, despite advocating for realist
trademarks like order and state sovereignty, China does not reject the international organizations
that have developed from a liberal order due to its current hierarchical ranking in these
institutions. Now that the liberal order is declining, China affirms the importance of order in
general to tame chaos that would presumably ensue otherwise, yet the type of order is not yet
clear. Considering the antagonist stance China has taken towards digital rights domestically
despite condemnation from international organizations and NGOs, China may aim to avoid
liberal solidarism. Instead, China pushes for a liberal pluralist order which still maintains
international organizations but upholds the importance of national sovereignty against what it
perceives to be the current priority for rights and democracy. In order to facilitate this, China
must first normalize their own approach to digital rights so that a future order could not condemn
rights that are not recognized.
When confronted by other states, particularly the United States, and international
organizations about its human rights record, China often counters by exposing the tainted human
rights records of other nations. This can be seen since 1998 when the Chinese government began
issuing a publication entitled Human rights record of the United States in response to U.S.
pointed criticisms of Chinese policies (Zhang, 2016). By doing so China is both standing firm in
its own treatment of digital rights but also delegitimizing the United States’ arguments based on
U.S. hypocrisy.
In addition to fighting back against condemnation, China is also taking the initiative to
promote its own digital rights agenda, including internet sovereignty. According to the 2018
Freedom on the Net report, the Chinese government hosted two to three week “training camps”
for media officials from multiple countries to teach about its own censorship and surveillance
systems (Shahbaz, 2018). President Xi publicly laid out a national plan to transform China into a
“cyber superpower” and presented China’s domestic cyber policies as “a new option for other
countries and nations that want to speed up their development while preserving their
independence” (Shahbaz, 2018). Staying true to this promise Chinese firms already provided
“high-tech tools of surveillance to governments that lack respect for human rights” (Shahbaz,
2018). This has proven to be a mutually beneficial project in the case of Zimbabwe where China
is receiving biometric data of millions of Zimbabweans without their consent in order to train
artificial intelligence programs to recognize darker skin tones.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, also known as One Belt One Road, has attracted
international attention as a massive global infrastructure project but the “Information Silk Road”
(National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of
Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 2015). that comes with it is not as well-known.
This project has been described by Council of Foreign Affairs scholars Stewart M. Patrick and
Ashley Feng (2018) as China’s attempt “to export its policy of authoritarian cyber controls,
giving countries the right to regulate and censor their own internet.” In order to accomplish this
goal the Chinese government is laying transcontinental and cross-border optical cables,
effectively undermining previous global internet and telecommunications infrastructures. As a
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result, global data is more vulnerable to the surveilling and censoring of Chinese intelligence
agencies (Shahbaz, 2018).
These international actions seem consistent with Chinese domestic policies in their
treatment of digital rights. China’s international cyber stance can be perceived as an attempt to
construct and disseminate a norm that calls for the subservient status of digital rights and more
generally human rights to global and domestic order. By making this a global norm, China would
no longer be subject to oft criticism from regulatory bodies and the international community.
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Russia
I. DOMESTIC CYBER POLICIES
“Propaganda of drugs and violence, human trafficking and child pornography—that’s the
reality of today’s Internet” (Ognyanova, 2015).
-Article written by Jury Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow in 2004.

Russia has a long, complicated history with information. In the days of the Soviet Union,
information and the media were so tightly controlled to the point that the ownership and use of
photocopiers was regulated by the state (CEU School of Public Policy, 2017). This long-term use
of state control of information may contribute to the current attitude of Russian citizens toward
internet censorship; 60 percent of Russians believe that the banning of certain website and
materials is necessary, according to a 2016 poll conducted by the Levada Center, a Russian
independent, non-governmental polling firm (Taylor, 2016). Indeed, according to Nathalie
Maréchal (2017) in her article Networked Authoritarianism and the Geopolitics of Information:
Understanding Russian Internet Policy, many Russians think the internet is dangerous and
threatening.
This fear is then often fanned by the Russian government and political class to portray the
internet as “unreliable, biased, and dangerous” to Russia’s 98.8 million internet users
(Ognyanova, 2015; Maréchal, 2017; Statista, 2019). The 1990s witnessed a brief relief in
restrictions of freedom of press before the government was seized by a new oligarch class which
in turn justified President Vladimir Putin’s “liberation” of media from oligarchs to state control
when he assumed office in 1999 (Maréchal, 2017). Since then, the internet has been under tight
state control. However, unlike China, Russia has rarely relied on obstacles to access, such as
infrastructural barriers and application level blocking, but instead on censorship, fear, and
intimidation (Maréchal, 2017). Katherine Ognyanova (2015) recognizes one mechanism that
allows the Russian state to control the media, which is increasingly dependent on the internet, as
the selective application of unrelated laws including: “building codes, tax laws, criminal laws,
and intellectual property laws” (Maréchal, 2017:31).
According to the 2018 Freedom on the Net report, various articles in the Russian criminal
code establish penalties for nine specific activities:
“general defamation (Article 128.1 of the criminal code), defamation against a judge or
prosecutor (Article 298.1), insulting the authorities (Article 319), calls for terrorism
(Article 205.1), insulting religious feelings (Article 148), calls for extremism (Article
280), calls for separatism (Article 280.1), and incitement of hatred (Article
282)…spreading false information on the activities of the Soviet Union in World War II
(Article 354.1)” (Freedom House, 2018c).
Furthermore, the Russian administrative code establishes penalties for two additional
activities: “displaying Nazi symbols or symbols of organizations deemed extremist” (Article 20.3
of the administrative code) and “the dissemination of extremist materials” (Article 20.29 of the
administrative code) (Freedom House, 2018c). According to these laws, the digital rights most
directly at risk are freedoms of expression (of which, freedom of speech is granted by the
Russian constitution), religion, and political participation, which then more indirectly puts the
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rights to privacy, assembly, fair trial, and association at risk. This has resulted in Russia’s
consistently poor ranking and scores in international indices for freedom of expression:
Reporters without Borders ranks Russia 148/180, 1 being the best and 180 being the worst, in the
2018 World Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders, 2018). In Freedom House’s 2017
Freedom of the Press report Russia ranked 83/100, where 1 is the best and 100 the worst
(Freedom House, 2017). This then translates to Russia’s current 67/100 score in Freedom
House’s 2018 Freedom on the Net report.
Within further laws and regulations, the justification of extremist content online is most
frequently used to validate censorship, imprisonment, and death. For example, the Russian
website Russiangate was blocked by Roskomnadzor (a Russian media regulator) for purported
“extremist content” a few hours after Russiangate published a report about an investigation of
real estate holdings for Alexander Bortnikov, the FSB (internal intelligence service) chief
(Schreck, 2018). In another case, Dmitry Popkov, the editor-in-chief of an independent local
newspaper called Ton-M in Siberia that often reports on abuses of power and corruption, was
murdered. Russian authorities deny responsibility (CPJ, 2017). The Bloggers Law, explained in
Table 4.1, is one recent example of a Russian law that legalizes and facilitates the violation of
digital rights. Russian actions can be accomplished by the purposefully vague nature defined in
laws which can be interpreted to include content that other countries would consider harmless
(Maréchal, 2017). Freedom House identifies removal-worthy content, according to Russia, to
including “LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex) expression, information on
the conflict in Ukraine, and material related to the political opposition,” the last of which seems
to apply to the aforementioned two examples (Freedom House, 2018c).
Website black-listing is a common tool of the Russian government for censorship. The
number of affected websites has steadily increased over the years—between 2012 and 2013
federal legal amendments gave Roskomnadzor and other agencies authority to make decisions
regarding what content warrants a website to be blocked. Roskomnadzor maintains a list of
blocked websites which authorities claim contain child abuse imagery, drug-related content,
information about suicide, copyright infringements, information about juvenile victims of crime,
and calls for public actions or rallies (Maréchal, 2017; Freedom House, 2018c). Similar to
Chinese censorship, Russia also portrays taking the high-ground of protecting the rights of
children to justify reassertion of state control over internet content. Unlike China, the protection
of gender equality rights is not a main argument for censorship. In fact, images of Anna
Zhavnerovich, a Moscow woman who was severely injured due to domestic violence, were
disseminated online and some internet users celebrated the violence against women (James and
Jones, 2017).6 This type of censorship is upheld by internet service providers (ISP) who must
refer to Roskomnadzor’s blacklist and who are encouraged to overestimate the reach of blocking
orders in order to avoid the consequences of heavy fines and loss of state licenses for reason of
under-censoring (Maréchal, 2017). In addition, ISPs have no legal specification on how to
restrict access resulting in accidental blockings. Consequently, 97 percent of accidental
blockings were caused by ISPs blocking according to IP addresses instead of domain name or
website URLs (Freedom House, 2018c).

6

Though it is important to note that this could also be interpreted as a push in the right direction for gender
equality in Russia because of Zhavnerovich’s decision to come forward and shame her ex-boyfriend despite
online harassment.
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Table 4.1 Russia Major Laws and Regulations
Law/Regulation
Foreign Agents Law

Law on Information,
Information Technology and
Information Security
(amendments)

Date
Purpose/Relevance
Promulgated
Registered NGOs that receive some foreign funding and
July 2012
engage in activities deemed political are subject to audits
and are marked as a foreign agent in official statements.
Smears organizations that are critical of the Russian
government.
Allows blocking of websites that instigate riots, extremist
February
or terrorist actions without a trial. Extends the overreach
2014
of the original law which fought child pornography.
Newest amendment requires foreign internet services to
store user data in Russia.

Bloggers Law

August
2014

All online outlets including blogs and personal pages with
social networking site with more than 3,000 daily readers
must register with Roskomnadzor (mass media regulator).

Law on Mass Media
(amendments)

January
2016

Prohibits foreign nationals and organizations from owning
more than a twenty-percent stake in any Russian media
outlet.

Law on News Aggregators

January
2017

Requires internet search engines with more than one
million daily users to check truthfulness of information
deemed publicly important before dissemination. News
deemed false must be removed from websites or face
financial penalties which leads to self-censorship in
private companies and the free flow of online information.

Yarovaya Law
(package of amendments)

July 2018

Obliges online services to provide encryption keys to the
internet, requires telecommunications providers to hold
records for six months and provide any information that is
federally requested, introduces prison terms of up to seven
years for calling for or justifying terrorism online. Limits
citizens’ privacy and ability to express political dissent.

Sources: (Freedom House, 2018c; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Article 19, 2017; Freedom
House, 2017)
Not all Russian citizens remain complicit in digital authoritarianism, particularly after a
steady worsening of their internet freedoms over the course of the last six years (Freedom House,
2018c). Russian internet penetration has increased in recent years, meanwhile an increasing
number of citizens are growing restless and fighting back against censorship and surveillance,
particularly following the government’s move to block the telecommunication app Telegram for
refusing to provide encryption keys to the FSB in April, 2017 (Freedom House, 2018c).
Thousands took to the streets and a “Digital Resistance” formed to support digital rights,
particularly the right to the internet (Aleksejeva, 2018). Concurrently, stricter laws were passed
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to restrict online anonymity, specifically by blocking VPNs and requiring other
telecommunication apps to link users to their personal information according to a 2018
amendment to the Law on Information, Information Technology and Information Security (see
Table 4.1).
Russia’s System of Operational-Investigatory Measures (SORM), a surveillance
technology used to provide intelligence agencies with telecommunications content, was also
expanded in April 2015 to incorporate deep packet inspection (DPI) technology. This update
provides greater access and searching capabilities of online communications, such as social
media platforms, to intelligence agents (Freedom House, 2018c). The information that is
collected and stored for long-term use includes recordings and locations (Soldatov and Borogan,
2013). Although the European Court for Human Rights deemed SORM in violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights in the 2015 court case Zakharov v. Russia, SORM added
more classified regulations that continue to affect all ISPs in Russia (Zakharov v. Russia,
[2015]).
Rumors of an internet “kill switch” have emerged following Russian cyber exercises that
revealed vulnerabilities in “RuNet’s security infrastructure preparedness against potential
external aggression” (Nocetti, 2015:5). This kill switch would allow the Russian government to
shut down the internet in Russia and could be used at the government’s discretion. This implies
that should large-scale civil protests break out, the Russian authorities would be able to
undermine them by blocking access to the internet. These types of internet shutdowns have
already been used by the governments of Egypt, Uganda, and Iran, in an effort to control
information regarding politically sensitive events (DeNardis, 2014). Besides violations of
political participation rights, an internet shutdown has far-reaching consequences on the
freedoms of expression, movement, and work (AccessNow, 2019). Despite a UN Security
Council meeting where Russia reassured members that no such kill switch exists in Russia, its
existence is not unheard of in other countries. Additionally, the strengthening of Russia’s state
internet control does not rule out the possibility of such a project becoming reality in the future
(Nocetti, 2015).
II. INTERNATIONAL STANCE
In 2014, President Vladimir Putin said the internet was a project of the CIA and is “still
developing as such” (Kelley, 2014). Given the deep mistrust Putin has of the United States and
its foreign policies, or arguably his desire to foment anti-U.S. sentiment within Russia, this is not
an entirely unexpected accusation. Moreover, the United States’ computer network beat out the
Soviet Union’s OGAS due to political infighting and became the internet that we all know today
(Baraniuk, 2016). Naturally, this gave U.S. companies the advantage by allowing them to control
large portions of the internet (Zimmer, 2017). This undoubtedly feeds into the paranoia of the
former KGB spy who is now aiming to make Runet, the Russian internet, independent (Matsakis,
2019).
Russia’s apparent goal of a fully autonomous internet took its first step with the newest
amendment to the Law on Information, Information Technology and Information Technology
which plans to create a Russian collection of national intranets separate from the current
globally-interconnected World Wide Web (Kelley, 2014). Much like the Chinese Information
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Silk Road, Russia’s ambition poses a threat to current global infrastructure which in turn could
affect the implementation of digital rights.
How these rights would be affected may be inferred based on Russia’s involvement in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This organization was founded in 2001 and is
comprised of Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, India, and Tajikistan
and currently has four observing states: Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia (Albert, 2015;
Michel, 2017). It is the Russian government’s relationship with China within the SCO that is
most telling of Russia’s international stance towards digital rights; their combined effort is being
used within this framework to aid member states in becoming better at “networked
authoritarianism” (Maréchal, 2017). This is then compounded with the SCO advocation of
restricting the flow of information that falls into three categories: terrorism, extremism, and
separatism. As described above, extremism is often a blanket reason applied to any form of
opposition online and thus results in policies that infringe on digital rights. Furthermore, the SCO
advocates for the “preventing [of] other nations from using their core technologies to destabilise
[sic] economic, social and political stability and security” (Kizekova, 2012:2). All these appear
to be indicators that the Russian stance towards global digital rights mirrors its own domestic
stance—one of censorship and surveillance. The implication mirrors those discussed in the China
section: the construction and dissemination of a norm that called for the avoidance of criticism
and devaluation of digital rights.
Under the leadership of Putin, Russia’s global and domestic stances on digital rights
remain consistent. An original rival to U.S. internet supremacy, Russia will no doubt continue to
undermine and advocate for the deterioration global internet infrastructures and digital rights in
order to assert its own digital sovereignty. Interference in the United States’ 2016 presidential
election exemplifies Russia’s ability to not only shake global confidence in the internet and
cyberspace—a feeling still shared by many Russian citizens—but also serves as a justification
for the implementation of “networked authoritarianism” by a state to protect its citizens from
such interferences.
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United States
I. DOMESTIC CYBER POLICIES
“The final freedom, one that was probably inherent in what both President and Mrs. Roosevelt
thought about and wrote about all those years ago, is… the freedom to connect – the idea that
governments should not prevent people from connecting to the internet, to websites, or to each
other. The freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in cyberspace.”
-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement on internet freedom on January 21st, 2010.

The right to freedoms of speech and press are protected by the First Amendment to the
Constitution. In 1997, the landmark Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union Supreme Court case
unanimously reaffirmed that the First Amendment extends to protect online speech (Reno v.
ACLU, [1997]). This decision rendered the 1996 Communications Decency Act, the first notable
attempt to regulate the dissemination of online pornographic material, unconstitutional and set
the precedent for future debates on online censorship (US Legal, 2019). As such, lower courts
have over the years repeatedly struck down attempts to regulate online content. Consequently,
Freedom House has consistently rated the United States as free in their yearly Freedom on the
Net reports which commenced in 2011. Yet, the United States’ internet freedom score has
increased from 13 to 22 from 2011 to 2018, indicating an overall worsening trend in internet
freedom.
There is no singular federal regulatory body for the internet in the United States, nor is
internet infrastructure state-owned. Private telecommunication companies such as Verizon,
AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile7 own and maintain infrastructure, allowing for multiple connection
points. Not only does this make the possibility of internet shutdowns highly unlikely, it serves as
a protective layer for citizens against spontaneous government censorship of political and social
content. However, laws governing other aspects of civil life have increasingly been extended to
the internet including: copyright violations, child pornography, content deemed “harmful” to
minors, gambling, and financial crimes (Freedom House, 2011). Of these listed, child
pornography and “harmful content” for minors have garnered the most legislative attention, in
turn stirring debate over how far freedom of speech applies. The three most influential laws
regarding this subject are the 1996 Communications Decency Act, 1998 Child Protection Act,
and 2001 Children’s Internet Protection Act (see Table 5.1). Of the three, the first two were
struck down for being unconstitutional for violating the freedom of speech provisions of the First
Amendment. However, the latter was upheld in 2003 due to its limited scope of implementation,
namely only in public libraries.

7

A T-Mobile and Sprint merger is in the works, however it is just as unlikely as likely to actually occur.
(Cheng, 2019).
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Table 5.1 United States Major Laws and Regulations
Law/Regulation

Date
Promulgated

Purpose/Relevance

Executive Order
12333

December
1981

Laid the foundation for how the NSA and other federal agencies may
conduct surveillance of the population within the United States.
Authorizes the collection of Americans’ metadata and communication
content when collected “incidentally.” Used as justification for PRISM
and the MYSTIC program which was used to document all outgoing and
incoming calls from target countries.

Patriot Act

October
2001

Broadens the use of wiretapping devices from telephone numbers to
internet and e-mail origins, without prior warrant requirement so long as
the information to be obtained is likely relevant to the investigation
against international terrorism. Broadens the definition of terrorism to
include domestic terrorism.

Children’s Internet
Protection Act

December
2001

Homeland Security
Act

November
2002

Requires libraries and some schools to install content filtering software on
their computers in order to block access to certain content, including:
pornography and bomb-making recipes. The software unintentionally
blocks various other kinds of speech, including: comedy, personal care,
short poems, and health sites.
Establishes the Department of Homeland Security. Gives authority to the
secretary of Homeland Security to direct and control investigations the
require information to investigate and prevent terrorism.

Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism
Prevention Act

December
2004

Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act
(FISA) Amendment
Act
USA FREEDOM
Act

July 2008

Cybersecurity
Information Sharing
Act

December
2015

Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of
Data Act (CLOUD)

March
2018

June 2015

Established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to oversee
the intelligence community. Section 6001 amends the definition of agent
of a foreign power in the FISA to add a “lone wolf” provision referring to
a foreign national who engages in international terrorism. Thus, easing the
process to apply for a court order.
Gives the NSA the ability to collect users’ communications data along
with its content from U.S. tech companies and through physical
infrastructure. Allows for the direct authorization of mass surveillance of
foreign nationals and the indirect mass surveillance of U.S. citizen
communications.
An extension of the expiring provisions of the Patriot Act without
significant changes to mass surveillance practices. However, limits what
can be done with U.S. citizens’ information in court and federal
proceedings when the NSA does not follow existing procedures. Also
limits bulk collection of Americans’ phone records under Section 215.
Protects U.S. companies from being sued for violating user privacy when
disclosing information to federal agencies. Requires the Department of
Homeland Security to tell private companies’ information about threats.
Criticized for not clearly defining when the use of data can be used for
cybersecurity or law enforcement purposes.
Updates the 1986 Stored Communications Act by clarifying how to
govern transnational data transfer. Expands the scope of law enforcement
access to user data by legitimizing law enforcement requests sent to U.S.
companies regardless if the data is stored within or outside the country.
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Allow States and
Victims to Fight
Online Sex
Trafficking Act

April
2018

Cracks down on websites that promote prostitution and sex trafficking
which has led to the preemptive censoring of legitimate content by
companies in order to avoid penalties.

Sources: (Gellman and Soltani, 2014; Homeland Security Act of 2002; Bazan, 2004; Butler,
2015; Keane and Swire, 2018; Freedom House, 2018d)
The United States’ relatively lax stance on censorship, while beneficial to some digital
freedoms like those of assembly, association, speech, and press, facilitates the near violation of
others, specifically gender equality and minority rights. Without stringent regulations, the issue
of websites promoting prostitution or sex trafficking, where the majority of victims are female,
has emerged. Although this may not be strictly considered a violation of their rights, the
disparate impact on women is important to note. Moreover, a study conducted by Amnesty
International found that 33 percent of female internet users between the ages of 18 and 55
experienced online abuse or harassment at least once (Amnesty International, 2017). The Pew
Research Center found that a quarter of African-Americans have been targeted and harassed
online due to their race or ethnicity. Similarly, 10 percent of Latinx individuals also faced racialtargeted harassment compared to only 3 percent of white Americans (Duggan, 2017). While acts
of harassment may not constitute a violation of minority rights, the incitement of racial tensions
online may lead to escalated racial tensions offline.
The Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (see Table 5.1) was
signed into law in 2018 with a primary purpose of prosecuting such websites. However, once
again, critiques emerged to argue that companies will preemptively censor legitimate content to
avoid penalties, thus undermining freedoms of press and speech (Freedom House, 2018d).
An even greater concern in recent years to digital rights in the United States is net
neutrality, referring to the regulation of internet infrastructure so that network service providers
must treat internet traffic equally. Because internet infrastructure is owned mainly by private
telecommunication companies in the United States, if net neutrality is foregone, then an
emergence of a pay-to-play business model is expected to emerge. This would mean ISPs would
be able to control the speed in which certain websites operate, thus providing preference to those
who are able to pay more.
This concern was then legitimized when the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), the leading quasi-regulatory internet body in the United States, voted in December 2017
to overturn provisions related to net neutrality in the 2015 Open Internet Order (Freedom House,
2018d). This move received harsh criticisms from open internet advocates and think tanks who
claim that without net neutrality protections internet users and access to information will be
adversely affected. In response, states like California are enacting their own net neutrality laws
despite threats of federal lawsuits (Kelly, 2018).
Perhaps the most infamous of United States’ domestic cyber policies, revealed by the
2013 Snowden leaks, is the prevalence of cyber intelligence gathering on its own citizens.
Authorized by the Patriot Act in 2001 and further expanded upon by Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, surveillance of both U.S. and
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non-U.S. citizens became commonplace (see Table 5.1). Two types of surveillance emerged:
upstream and downstream. The former refers to the collecting of communications as they travel
through infrastructure and the latter, infamously exemplified by PRISM, refers to the collection
of communications from multinational technology companies like Google, Facebook, and
Yahoo, often times through force (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2019). The Snowden
Revelations incited international uproar due to their scope; any U.S. and non-U.S. citizen within
or outside of the country who is believed to have communications to or from any foreigner with
foreign intelligence information, regardless of how vaguely interpreted, is potentially subject to
surveillance. Critics like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an international non-profit digital
rights advocacy group, were quick to point out that not only do these practices undermine users’
right to privacy, they also undermine fundamental legal rights, including the Fourth Amendment
which protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Following these revelations public outcry led to subsequent policies to marginally curtail
mass surveillance. One of such policies is the 2015 USA FREEDOM Act which extended
provisions of the Patriot Act under the condition to limit the bulk collection of Americans’ phone
records (Shahbaz, 2018). Despite this attempt, long-term distrust of government surveillance
coupled with earlier explanations of online harassment has led internet users to practice selfcensorship. Reminders of mass surveillance especially effect users’ willingness to express
minority public opinions online, according the 2018 United States Freedom on the Net Report
(Freedom House, 2018d).
The history of censorship in the United States presents three models to different
censorship scenarios and their effects on digital rights. First, prior to 2013 when citizens of the
United States were unaware of mass governmental surveillance, general freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly were at their peak. Albeit this is at the expense of gender, child, and
minority rights which then diminished these groups’ freedom of expression due to selfcensorship. Second, after the public became aware of mass surveillance, a decline in freedom of
expression and assembly was witnessed as described in the previous paragraph. Third, in the
same vein, mass surveillance itself violates the digital rights to privacy, expression, and
association by limiting anonymity, but in turn protects marginalized groups because of selfcensorship and regulation of disinformation and hate speech. For that reason, surveillance and a
completely open internet are double-edged swords. The former is not intrinsically repressive, nor
is the latter wholly egalitarian in the case of the United States.

II. INTERNATIONAL STANCE
At the turn of the century, U.S. President Bill Clinton embraced the proliferation of the
internet as a tool in which “liberty will be spread by cell phone and cable modern” (Griffiths,
2018). The United States took the lead in the West, emphasizing the importance of the internet
and digital rights in advancing democracy and liberal values. Indeed, the internet’s ability to
allow users access to vast amounts of information is often cited as a defining factor for the
democratization of states (Bimber, 2003; Freyburg et al., 2011; Schimmelfennig 2014). This idea
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stems from the notion that by providing a variety of sources of information and thus differing
opinions, citizens will be more willing to participate in the policy-making process (Weare, 2002).
Scholars like Benkler (2006) and Jenkins (2006) argued that the internet would increase
exposure to more diverse perspectives outside of mainstream thought, including a greater
diversity of political information independent of state control. This diversity of information
would then help citizens make better decisions, therefore simultaneously benefiting both
democracies and liberating individuals in oppressive countries (Mutz and Martin, 2001;
Diamond 2010).
For this reason, the United States has been a strong international advocate for an open
internet, free from censorship and surveillance under repressive regimes. Following an internet
shutdown in Egypt during political unrest, U.S. President Barack Obama declared that the U.S.
“stand[s] for universal value, including the rights of the Egyptian people to freedom of assembly,
freedom of speech, and the freedom to access information” (Tully, 2014:179). Similarly,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged the importance of digital rights, even the
controversial right to the internet, in the opening quote of this section.
The efforts by the United States to champion internet access have encountered several
setbacks. The 2013 Snowden revelations revealed the United States’ hypocritical stance on
privacy and surveillance. Despite publicly denouncing digital authoritarianism and encouraging
foreign nationals to utilize digital media to exercise their digital rights, the United States
differentiates the rights of non-U.S. and U.S. citizens as such: “US persons may only be targeted
if there is a judicial warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), whereas
non-US persons can be targeted without FISC-approved individual warrant” (Watt, 2017:775).
This division clearly undermines the universality of digital rights, thus threatening their
recognition as a human right. Surely the international community sees the irony of the Obama
administration’s explicit recognition of global privacy rights in Presidential Policy Directive
No.28 and the continuous reinstatement of mass surveillance practices through various policies
with differing names (Margulies, 2013).
The position the United States touts regarding digital rights does not align with its own
domestic policies, let alone its international stance. Prior to 2013, the advocacy by the United
States for an open internet had legitimacy, as did its criticisms of Russia and China for restricting
their citizens’ online rights. However, a post-Snowden United States continues to face a serious
backlash and effectively breed distrust even among its allies (Spiegel Online, 2013).
Furthermore, the lack of action by the United States concerning Chinese mass internment and
censorship of its Uighur population in Xinjiang and the spread of malicious disinformation to
breed hostility against the Rohingya in Burma highlights how the United States is mostly a
figurehead for the free internet movement, rather than a proponent to its normalization (Fuchs et
al., 2018; CBSN Originals, 2018).
This is not to say that the United States is not an important influence for the protection of
digital rights. Despite an overall worsening trend in internet freedom and digital rights, the
United States remains a remarkably strong case for freedoms of speech, assembly, and political
participation. In a time of rising digital authoritarianism, the United States serves as a model for

32

how the internet can be used to further diversity in political discourse with minimal legal or
technical restriction on publication or access (Freedom House, 2011). Moreover, even what has
become known as the “greatest privacy meltdown of our time,” (referring to the Snowden
revelations) had only a small impact on internet users’ online behaviors (Preibusch, 2015:48). In
short, the United States is not the perfect advocate for its own purported values but its global
influence and state-level progress to rectify the hypocrisy have made it an important actor.8
Additionally, the United States’ emphasis on freedom of speech allows for NGOs within its civil
society to be proponents for internet freedom.

8

However, this may be changing under the Trump administration. Reports emerged this year that a proposal is
in the works to use social media to identify people who are falsely claiming Social Security disability benefits.
Such a proposal allows for further surveillance of the American pubic and disproportionately affects those with
disabilities (Pear, 2019).

33

Germany
I. DOMESTIC CYBER POLICIES
“The freedom of expression also protects repugnant and ugly remarks. But, freedom of
expression is not a pass to commit crimes. Those who share criminal content online must be held
accountable to justice. Calls for murder, hate speech, or Holocaust denial are not expressions of
freedom of expression but are instead attacks on the freedom of expression of others.”
-Minister of Justice and Consumer Protection Heiko Maas on January 3rd, 2018.

The use of propaganda to incite hatred against minorities was prevalent prior to and
during the second world war in Germany. Therefore, post-WWII legislation was intended to
criminalize such activity. With the introduction of the internet Germany was quick to extend its
Criminal Code to encompass online content, particularly through Section 130 which addresses
incitement of hatred:
(1) Whosoever, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace
1. Incites hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group defined by their
ethnic origins, against segments of the population or individuals because of their
belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or segments of the population or calls
for violent or arbitrary measures against them; or
2. Assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning an
aforementioned group, segments of the population or individuals because of their
belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or segments of the populations, or
defaming segments of the populations,
shall be liable to imprisonment from three months to five years. (Appell, 2019)
Much like the United States and other democracies, Germany must battle between how to
tackle online hate speech in conjunction with upholding freedoms of expression and media and
the right to privacy, all of which are protected by Germany’s Basic Law Articles 5 and 10,
respectively. Harsher boundaries around online speech and activities are seen as more legitimate
to many Germans compared to civilians of other countries because of their country’s history
(Freedom House, 2018b). German penal law routinely allows for censorship in the cases of hate
speech, dissemination of child pornography, glorification of violence, and Holocaust denial.
Of these categories, laws protecting against child pornography have been the hardest to
uphold. The Access Impediment Act was passed in June of 2009 and was intended to block
websites containing child pornography. Before implementation took into effect, a new
governmental party coalition formed and criticized the act on civil rights grounds. Consequently,
when the law was promulgated it was altered to only use the take-down provision rather than
blocking websites due to heavy backlash from internet freedom activists who said the law was
the beginning of internet censorship and a violation of expression (European Digital Rights,
2011). In April 2011, governing bodies decided to repeal the law altogether. However, the
introduction of a new law, the Network Enforcement Act (also called NetzDG, see Table 6.1), at
the start of 2018 has brought this issue up once again for public debate.

34

Table 6.1 Germany Major Laws and Regulations
Law/Regulation
Act for Limiting the Secrecy
of Letters, the Post, and
Telecommunications
Freedom of Information
Legislation
Act on Strengthening Press
Freedom
Asylum Law (amendments)

Source Telecommunications
and Online Surveillance
Law

German Privacy Act
(BDSG-new)
Law for More Effective and
More Practical Criminal
Proceedings
Social Network
Enforcement Law

Network Enforcement Act
(NetzDG)

Date
Purpose/Relevance
Promulgated
Allows secret services to intercept, monitor, and record
2001
private communications, and it differentiates between the
protected professions. Allows for the surveillance of
counselors and journalists in certain situations
Establishes information held by public authorities should
2006
be open and available, however has exceptions and every
request requires fees
Improves protections for journalists and their sources,
June 2012
strengthens related sections in the Criminal Code and
Code of Criminal Procedure
Allows for the copying and analyzing of arriving refugees’
2017
electronic devices’ in order to determine where the person
came from and where they spent their time if he or she
does not provide identity documents.
Allows law enforcement and the state to install malware
June 2017
known as State Trojans on electronic devices for
surveillance purposes and perform online searches to
investigate criminal offenses. Amends the German
Criminal Code.
Governs the exposure of personal data and protects
July 2017
individuals’ personal rights when personal information is
being processed. Does not apply where GDPR applies.
Includes an extensive list of criminal offenses that could
August
allow for the deployment of spyware on suspects’
2017
electronic devices for the purpose of copying and
monitoring written and spoken text.
Pushes to curb the dissemination of hate speech, terrorist
October
propaganda, and fake news on social media, establishes
2017
fines against social networking companies in the event
that they do not remove flagged criminal content from
their platforms
Obliges social media platforms with more than 2 million
January
registered users in the country to delete offensive illegal
2018
content within 24 hours and or else face hefty fines. These
platforms are given one week to review content that is
deemed more legally ambiguous.

Sources: (Freedom House, 2018b; Freedom House, 2013; European Digital Rights, 2011;
Appell, 2018; OpenNet Initiative, 2010; Deloitte, 2019)
NetzDG was the result of Minister of Justice and Consumer Protection Heiko Maas’ push
to mitigate the increasing amount of hate speech online as a result of the influence of social
media in recent elections, the polarization of political opinions, and the rise of civil unrest
(Appell, 2018). Under this law, internet platforms must ensure that their websites only contain
legal content, thus shifting the responsibility away from internet users. Social media companies
in particular are compelled to remove hate speech. For this reason, NetzDG draws criticism from
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both sides of the political spectrum in Germany, including the far-left Left Party and the far-right
Alternative for Germany. Human Rights Watch also argues that this law violates Germany’s
obligation to respect free speech because (1) the burden of censorship falls on companies under
conditions that then encourages censoring of potentially lawful speech as a precaution and, (2)
NetzDG fails to provide judicial oversight (Appell, 2018). Despite criticisms against the
implementation of this law, which Chancellor Angela Merkel has said is subject to alteration, the
intention seems to strike a balance between freedom of expression and hate speech which
violates others’ freedom of expression (Cooper, 2018). Yet, by doing so even Maas points out
that digital rights are subservient to the law, opening the door for further policies to legally limit
rights and bring into question the inalienability of digital rights.
This sentiment also holds true when it comes to users’ privacy. According to Germany’s
Criminal Procedure Code Section 100a, “telecommunication of an individual may be monitored
and recorded if:
1. Specific facts substantiate the suspicion that somebody was the perpetrator or
participant in a serious crime as listed in paragraph 2 or, in cases where the attempt is
liable to persecution, has attempted to commit such crime, or has prepared such crime
by means of a criminal offense
2. The alleged crime would weigh heavily even taken individually
3. Investigating the act or determining the suspected person’s location by other means
would be significantly impeded or futile without surveillance” (OpenNet Initiative,
2010).
This provision gives a legal basis to require German ISPs and online service providers to
retain some types of data for up to six months, even without initial suspicion of illegal activity.
This has been the case in the southern state of Bavaria where a bill was introduced in the
beginning of 2018 that has been called the hardest policing law since 1945 (Bröckling , 2018).
Under this law, concrete evidence of a specific crime is unnecessary for police to preventatively
access any information technology system (Freedom House, 2018b). Similarly, amendments
made in 2017 to the German Asylum Law (see Table 6.1) allows for the copying and analyzing
of refugees’ electronic devices in order to determine their place of origin in cases where
documentation cannot be provided (Freedom House, 2018b). Moreover, new legislation like the
Law for More Effective and More Practical Criminal Proceedings shown in Table 6.1 allow law
enforcement agencies to install malware on suspects’ electronic devices in order to aid in
criminal investigations. One such malware is the “Bundestrojaner”, or federal Trojan horse,
which has been legally in use since August 2017 (Prantl, 2018). This software clandestinely
records data in order to extract needed information and has been justified by German authorities
as a measure against terrorism and right-wing extremism.
Germany’s position within the European Union greatly influences domestic policies. In
April 2017, Germany’s federal parliament, the Bundestag, incorporated in its own domestic law
the European Union rules on net neutrality (Freedom House, 2018b). Prior to this, Germany
defined basic requirements for a non-discriminatory data transfer system, however no
requirements were established (Freedom House, 2013). As discussed in the previous section, net
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neutrality ensures equal opportunity to view, interact with, and share information online for
internet users and is essential for the full enjoyment of the right to information.
In May 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which has been called the
most important change in data privacy regulation in 20 years, went into effect (European
Commission, 2019). This law contains 70 opening clauses in order to allow European Union
member states to legally enact and modify the GDPR to fit their domestic environment. In order
to conform to the requirements of the GDPR, Germany replaced its previous privacy act, the
BDSG, with the BDSG-new (see Table 6.1) in the same month (Deloitte, 2019). Under this new
law and regulation, any company, regardless of where it is located, that processes the personal
information of individuals residing in the European Union must respect that individual’s rights or
else face hefty fines (European Commission, 2019). These rights include: breach notification,
right to access, data portability, privacy by design, access to a data protection officer, and the
right to be forgotten (European Commission, 2019).
Among its goals of obtaining more meaningful consent, increasing data collection
transparency, and giving users the ability to manage their data directly, the GDPR also legally
reinforced a new digital right in Germany: the right to be forgotten (European Commission,
2019; Freedom House, 2018b). This right “reflects the claim of an individual to have certain data
deleted so that third persons can no longer trace them” (Weber, 2011:121). Furthermore, this
right allows internet users to withdraw their consent to data processing at any time. The right to
be forgotten differs from the right to privacy because rather than dealing with information that is
not publicly known, it is used to remove information that is publicly known at any certain time
and blocks third parties from accessing the information when it is gone (Weber, 2011). Much
like the right to the internet, the right to be forgotten has been criticized for degrading the
concept of human rights (Mayes, 2011). Furthermore, the right to be forgotten is seemingly at
odds with freedoms of expression and press and the right to privacy. The GDPR has rules
providing exceptions to the right to be forgotten in cases where the exercising of freedom of
expression and information are necessary, however these exceptions are not well defined
(Human Rights Watch, 2018b). Such a right may also be used as a justification for censorship or
as a legal way to rewrite history in the hands of the wrong government. This right has also been
criticized for enabling people in positions of power to abuse it in order to remove harmful
articles that discuss their previous criminal convictions (Human Rights Watch, 2018b). Yet,
advocates claim that it is the only way to resolve perpetual online stigmas from scenarios such as
long-standing minor infraction records, false accusations, and revenge porn (Arthur, 2014).
This right was first established in a May 2014 EU Court of Justice decision in the case of
Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario Costeja. The GDPR also ensures the protection of this right,
however debate surrounding its legitimacy is still occurring in Germany, particularly after the
June 2018 European Court of Human Rights case of M.L and W.W. v. Germany. This case
decided that there was no violation of Article 8 (right to respect private life) in the case of two
German half-brothers who murdered a popular actor and were seeking to prohibit a media
company from keeping a transcript of a past interview on its internet portal (Google Spain v.
AEPD and Mario Costeja, [2014]). In this case, the scenario resulted in the freedom of press to
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outweigh the right to be forgotten. However, the right to be forgotten has been successfully
utilized against Google where approximately 670,835 requests to delete search results in the
European Union have been assessed. The scope of these requests would affect over 2 million
URLs, nearly 112,000 of which coming from Germany (Google, 2018).
Apart from the controversy that surrounds the right to be forgotten, the GDPR gives users
back partial control over their data and holds large social media companies accountable. In
general, media and internet freedom are well-respected within Germany where substantial
safeguards are in place to protect essential digital rights. Perhaps the best example of the ability
to exercise these rights is the lively debate surrounding them in Germany. For this reason, of the
four case studies Germany has the best score for Freedom House Freedom on the Net score of 19
out of 100 in 2018.
II. INTERNATIONAL STANCE
As the unofficial leader of the European Union, regulations like the GDPR generally
require the support of Germany. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, the impact of the
GDPR on international relations will be a proxy for Germany’s international stance. As
previously discussed above, the GDPR applies to all companies that process the personal
information of individuals located within the European Union, regardless of the location of the
company. Furthermore, those outside of the European Union whose data is being collected or
processes by companies within the European Union are also affected (Read, 2018). Given the
global nature of the internet, this has far reaching implications and virtually every company or
organization with at least one client or employee located within the EU must follow the
regulation. Consequently, the GDPR forces non-EU and EU-member states to confront
regulatory differences and raises questions about internet, user, and territorial sovereignties.
Regulatory differences are especially pronounced between the United States and the European
Union where a well-established transcontinental data transfer system has been in place for
decades (Kobrin, 2004). The GDPR places users’ and internet sovereignties above territorial
sovereignty. Indeed, there are concerns that the facilitation of the expansion of internet
sovereignty by the GDPR already violates Israeli sovereignty (Or-Hof, 2018). Unlike China’s or
Russia’s view of internet sovereignty, which falls within territorial sovereignty, the European
Union sees internet sovereignty as transnational because it falls within user sovereignty.
The NetzDG law also has international influence. Article 19, a British human rights
organization that advocates for freedom of expression, argued that the NetzDG “severely
undermine[s] freedom of expression in Germany, and is already setting a dangerous example to
other countries” (Global Network Initiative, 2017). Despite Freedom House’s score as one of the
most free countries on the net, the NetzDG is setting a precedent for less free countries on how to
force social media companies to act as censors. In Singapore, the government cited the NetzDG
law as a positive example while it attempts to crack down on fake news through overly broad
criminal laws (Ministry of Communications and Information and Ministry of Law, 2018).
Additionally, Russia cited provisions in NetzDG when proposing its own laws to censor Russian
citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2018a). Human Rights Watch also warns that the implications of
the NetzDG law had a domino effect in the aforementioned countries as well as the Philippines,
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Venezuela, Kenya, and the United Kingdom (Human Rights Watch, 2018a). Therefore, despite
being an advocate for digital rights domestically and attempting to strike a balance between
censorship of freedoms of expression, Germany is currently serving as an indirect advocate for
systematic censorship internationally.
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Comparative Analysis and the Consideration of Regime Type
I. TRANSPARENCY
Transparency and human rights have an arguably overlapping relationship. This
governmental trait is a required prerequisite for both good governance and the protection of
human rights. Human rights and good governance have a mutually reinforcing relationship, and
both set the boundaries in which governments must work. Transparency allows individuals to
hold governments accountable when they work outside those lines; therefore, without it the
status of human rights and good governance are hard to clearly decipher.
Patrick Birkinshaw (2006) recognizes that a specific attribute of transparency, namely the
freedom of information which extends from access to government information, deserves special
protections and argues that this particular attribute ought to be treated as an internationally
recognized human right. For the purpose of this thesis, the direct overlapping of transparency and
human rights will be delinked as the specific attribute Birkinshaw mentions falls within the
domain of digital rights.9 As such, transparency will simply refer to openness of governmental
operations to ensure that the government is working in the best interest of its people, not select
groups.
Indeed, the internet is fundamentally a transparent endeavor. It facilitates the limitless
transborder exchange of photo, texts, videos, sounds, documents, and more. This data and
information can then be sorted, stored, and queried by anyone with access to the internet. This of
course is in an ideal world; the reality is the internet is controlled by states and where an internet
user is located can greatly affect access to information.10 It would then logically follow that the
transparency, that is openness of the governmental system to the general public, of a state may
affect the treatment of digital rights.
This section will first examine the transparency of each case study and their treatment of
digital rights. Although the concepts of control of corruption is not a perfect measure of
transparency because it does not wholly encompass the concept transparency, this indicator will
be used as a proxy variable for transparency because it does address transparency, accountability,
and corruption in the public sector. This indicator includes both oversight and civil society
access and acknowledges the relationship between accountability and transparency by way of
corruption levels. When initially using this indicator, the percentile rank was used but, in an
effort to provide greater accuracy, was opted out in favor for the governance score.11 The
standard error which measures the precision of the estimate of each indicator for both the
transparency and political stability sections were evaluated. Each score was found to be at or
9

It is also for this reason that the voice and accountability global governance indicator was not used to measure
transparency. This indicator measures the perceptions of the extent in which a country’s citizens are able to
participate in their government by exercising various rights, thus overlapping with digital rights. Moreover, the
voice and accountability indicator was analyzed and the results seemed to indicate collinearity between the
measures.
10 Various types of software exist to circumvent a state’s internet sovereignty, VPNs come first to mind.
However, these can also be affected, criminalized, or controlled by states. While in China the author
experienced this when during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China many VPNs
temporarily stopped working.
11 However, both measures of control of corruption demonstrated largely the same findings.
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below 0.24, indicating a sufficiently precise score.12 The analysis of the control of corruption
indicator and Freedom House violation of users’ rights scores and internet freedom scores will be
used to assess the following hypotheses: H1 as a state’s transparency decreases it is more likely
to be invasive of its citizens’ digital rights and, H2 as a state’s transparency increases it is more
likely to protect its citizens’ digital rights. Transparency will be measured by the World Bank’s
control of corruption global governance indicator. This indicator accounts for the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, as well as the level in which the state is influenced by
elites and private interests.
A. China
China, the consistently worst abuser of internet users’ digital rights according to Freedom
House (see Figure 7.1), superficially seems to appear to have a correlation between transparency
and internet freedom score, albeit not an expected one. The control of corruption governance
score (transparency) improved every year for a total improvement of +0.26 between 2011 and
2016 (see Figure 7.2).
Figure 7.1 Freedom House User Rights Violation Scores 2011-2018
China

Russia

United States

Germany

40

USER RIGHTS VIOLATION SCORE

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

YEAR

Source: Data from Freedom House Freedom on the Net Reports for China, Russia, United States, and
Germany from 2011-2018

12

The control of corruption standard error was more precise than political stability with a highest score of
0.16.
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This improvement could be attributed to President Xi’s campaign against corruption
which began following the 18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012. In the same year,
corruption within the CCP was “spiraling out of control” which was exasperated when top CCP
politician Bo Xilai was under investigation after his wife was convicted of murdering a foreigner
(Schmitz, 2017). This event may have catalyzed Xi’s crusade against corruption which has thus
far led to the investigation and punishment of hundreds of thousands of government officials
(Schmitz, 2017). Concurrently, Figure 7.1 shows that China’s Freedom House scores for
violation of users’ rights has also risen consistently, indicating a worsening of users’ rights.
Indeed, China reached the scale’s highest score of 40 in 2015 and remained there since.
Figure 7.2 World Bank Control of Corruption Global Governance Indicator 2011-2017
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Looking at Figure 7.3, China’s overall freedom score has also been worsening since
2011, with the exception of a 1-point dip in 2017. Upon closer inspection, this dip was due to a
slight improvement in obstacles to access the internet. This subsection remained constant in 2018
but the overall internet freedom score returned to 2016 levels due to a worsening of limits on
content. Therefore, this slight “improvement” is not related to digital rights but a slight
improvement of infrastructure and internet penetration rates. Interestingly, this dip in 2017 is
also mirrored in Figure 7.2 by a -0.02 worsening of transparency. A possible explanation could
Governance scores begin in 2011 to mirror the onset of Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net reports in
order to provide more accurate analysis. No scores were provided for 2018.
13
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be the CCP’s opaqueness in dealing with anti-corruption and bribery. In 2017, the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was authorized to conduct random checks on the
“Leading Cadres’ Personal Matters Report Form,” a 16-page background check form (Zheng,
2019). Ironically, the CCP’s attempts to increase transparency by weeding out corruption has led
to less transparency in its proceedings.
Figure 7.3 Freedom House Internet Freedom Scores 2011-2018
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A. Russia
As easily the least transparent state out of the four case studies, Russia has no clear
relationship between transparency and digital rights abuse. Between 2011 and 2014, Russia’s
control of corruption governance score improved slightly by +0.15 but worsened slightly by
-0.03 points in 2015 (see Figure 7.2). According to Transparency International, this initial
improvement could be attributed to President Medvedev’s anti-corruption campaign, particularly
anti-bribery legislation and the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of
Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation to Improve State Anti-Corruption
Management (Kremlin, 2011). However, corruption under President Putin has been inconsistent,
albeit relatively consistently bad, with a marginal improvement in 2016 of +0.13 but a return to
almost 2014 levels in 2017. Despite being corrupt himself, President Putin pushes to improve the
state anti-corruption system (Cooke, 2014; Kremlin, 2016). While Russia’s transparency teetered
over the last decade, its internet freedom score and violation of users’ rights score remained
consistent. Figures 7.1 and 7.3 show a worsening of internet freedom and users’ rights between
2011 and 2017, but with an exception of a 1-point improvement in 2018. In 2015, Russia’s
internet freedom score crossed over from partially free to not free and has remained so.

43

B. United States
The United States is a robust democracy, as such the control of corruption scores are
significantly better than the previous two case studies. This is due to extensive laws, acts, and
statutes put into place, on the state and federal level, that date back to the founding of the United
States. Such legislation continues to be expanded upon, including the introduction of the
American Ant-Corruption Act of 2011.
Yet, corruption does exist within the United States which explains the fluctuation of its
control of corruption scores in Figure 7.2. Despite high levels of corruption control and a
relatively large increase of +0.14 in 2012 compared to 2011, Figure 7.2 shows a drop of -0.1 the
following year. Indeed, in 2013 60 percent of Americans felt this drop and expressed concern,
albeit falsely, that corruption increased since 2011 (Bidwell, 2013). Although public opinion on
corruption is not always accurate, Transparency International did conclude that the United States
has fallen six places in its 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index since 2017, confirming a general
downward trend since 2015 (Detrick, 2019). During this time, a general upward trend can be
seen in Figures 7.1 and 7.3, indicating a worsening of internet freedom and users’ rights
violations. However, given the inconsistent nature of the transparency scores it is not accurate to
correlate the transparency trends starting from 2016 to the trends in Figures 7.1 and 7.3.
C. Germany
Germany has the highest rankings every year out of the four case studies according to the
World Bank’s control of corruption global governance indicator. This ranking has remained
consistently at 1.84 since 2014 and experienced only minimal fluctuation in the two years prior
to that. A 2013 Freedom House report attributed Germany’s institutional setup as the reasoning
for its ability to ensure integrity and avoid corruption in state bodies (Freedom House, 2013).
Figures 7.1 and 7.3 show mild inconsistency between Germany’s internet freedom scores and
users’ rights violation scores. Figure 7.1 shows that Germany is steadily increasing its violations
to its users’ violations over the last 8 years, increasing from a score of 7 to a score of 11.
Meanwhile Figure 7.3 shows that between 2011 and 2017 Germany’s internet freedom
worsened, except in 2012 when it improved by 1 point due to a 1-point improvement on limits on
content. Unlike the United States, Germany’s internet freedom score is not mostly influenced by
its violations on users’ rights. Instead, limits on content and obstacles to access is more varied
over the years and influence the overall internet freedom score more. Regardless, neither the
general upward trend seen in Figure 7.3 nor the clear upward trend seen in Figure 7.1 appears to
correlate with the generally stagnant transparency trend seen in Figure 7.2.
D. Key Findings
This thesis hypothesized both that a correlation exists between a state’s transparency and
treatment of digital rights. Two hypotheses were specifically stated; H1 as a state’s transparency
decreases it is more likely to be invasive of its citizens’ digital rights and, H2 as a state’s
transparency increases it is more likely to protect its citizens’ digital rights. The data presented in
Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 not only refute these hypotheses, but suggest that a strong correlation
appears to not exist. If such a correlation existed, then China, as the worst violator of digital
rights, would be the least transparent state. Yet, Russia is significantly less transparent but is
marginally more respective of digital rights. However, a possible explanation for this
discrepancy is that Russia is an exception to the rule. The analyses of the other three states seem
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to suggest general patterns, especially when considering that the indices chosen are not perfect
measures.
China’s transparency scores and Freedom House scores might superficially suggest that
there may exist a correlation, however this may be a coincidence of the data.14 Similarly, despite
a clear upward trend in Germany’s violation of users’ rights, no general upward or downward
trend is witnessed in the same years for transparency. Russia’s and the United States’ teetering
transparency scores run concurrently with the general upwards trends of internet freedom and
violation of users’ rights scores.
Generally speaking, states with greater transparency tend to have less violations of users’
rights and, consequently, better internet freedom scores. However, a correlation between
transparency and treatment of digital rights is not clearly demonstrated. Instead, the data
represented in these figures concerning transparency and treatment of digital rights appear to be
dependent variables of another factor, perhaps regime types. It is perhaps no coincidence that the
two states with positive transparency scores and lower scores for violation of users’ rights are
both liberal democracies. Nor is it perhaps a coincidence that the states with negative
transparency scores and higher violation of users’ rights scores are both authoritarian regimes.
Given the authoritarian nature of China, it is surprising that there is an upward trend in
transparency, however this can be attributed to President’s Xi anti-corruption campaign. It is in
the best interest of authoritarian governments to violate digital rights because of media’s ability
to bring attention to and shame corrupt individuals and political scandals, which may result in
political unrest.
Moreover, although the data collected in this thesis does not appear to demonstrate a
clear correlation, one may still exist. The inability of the data to confirm these hypotheses may
be due to the secretive nature in which states implement internet and cyber policies. United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, warned of a “disturbing lack of
transparency about governmental surveillance policies and practices” (Pally, 2014). This lack of
transparency makes determining a state’s overall treatment of digital rights impossible to
determine. Consequently, the scores by Freedom House in Figures 7.1 and 7.3, while helpful, do
not show the whole picture. For example, prior to the Snowden revelations in 2013 the United
States’ internet freedom and users’ rights violations scores were declining despite ongoing
surveillance. Only after the revelations were exposed did these scores change. Perhaps a
correlation may still exist if all the data were present. In transparent states it may seem like there
are more violations of digital rights because information regarding policies is more open to the
public. This could help explain how in China as transparency increased, so did knowledge of
users’ rights violation.

II. POLITICAL STABILITY
The level of political stability in each case study will also be measured by a World Bank
global governance indicator, in this case more directly by the political stability and absence of
14

When the voice and accountability indicator was being considered a similar analysis to the one presented
above was conducted. This indicator produced results that seemed to affirm H1 and H2 but, as mentioned in an
earlier footnote, this is a probably a result of collinearity.
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violence/terrorism indicator. This indicator measures the likelihood of political instability along
with politically motivated violence, including terrorism, protests, riots, and war. This indicator,
along with the Freedom House data, will be utilized to analyze the following hypotheses: H3
states with low levels of political stability are more likely to interfere in their citizens’ digital
rights through policies that are claimed necessary to protect national security, and H4 states with
high levels of political stability are more likely to implement policies to protect their citizens’
digital rights.
These hypotheses work under the assumption that a relationship between political
stability and treatment of human rights exists, thus implying a relationship between political
stability and digital rights also exists. The former already has a substantial amount of literature
backing it by various human rights scholars (see Henderson, 1991; Mitchell and McCormick,
1988; Poe and Tate, 1994). Although a relationship exists, Mitchell and McCormick (1988)
would disagree that there is a direct relationship, but rather political stability is a factor within
regime type. These scholars found that democracies and states affected by democracy
development tend to have greater respect for human rights (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988).
Political instability then relates to regime type by the presence or absence of regular and irregular
government change in different types of regimes. Feng (1997) concluded that democracies tend
to allow major and frequent regular government change and reduces the probability of irregular
government change, thus allowing for a politically stable environment. By contrast, nondemocracies do not allow for frequent major regular government change, instead the rule of one
dominant party eventually evolves into irregular government change, otherwise known as
political instability.
Although a state’s government type does affect treatment of human rights and level of
political stability separately, this section will look to see if a direct correlation between political
stability and digital rights appears to exists. This will allow for a more nuanced analysis of the
relationship between human rights and political stability by analyzing specific case studies over
the last decade which has seen the decline of the old liberal order.
A. China
Despite two decades of collective leadership and smooth transitions of power, China’s
political stability and absence of terrorism ranking has remained in the lower quartile range since
2000. Additionally, China’s political stability governance scores remained negative throughout
the last decade (see Figure 7.4). The CCP’s strategy of choosing successors, sometimes years
prior to the expected ending of the current leader’s term, allowed for strong continuity of CCP
rule without the upset of elections (Palmer, 2018). However, this tradition that began with Deng
Xiaoping in the 1980s was suddenly abolished when President Xi15 ended term limits in 2018.
This move may afford temporary and factitious political stability as many repressive
dictatorships tend to do in their early years but coincides with a plethora of destabilizing internal
factors (Von Rohr, 2014). The carceral archipelago16 of the western provinces of Tibet and

15

Often called Emperor Pooh, a nod to the censorship of Winnie the Pooh in China due to the supposed
likeness he shares with the animated character.
16 (Foucault, 1975) Coined from the book Discipline and Punish which talks about surveillance systems and
technology in modern societies to practice social control in all areas of social life.
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Xinjiang, rising separatist sentiment in Taiwan, militarization within the nine-dash line, and
terrorist attacks all contribute to China’s low levels of political stability (Tsirbas, 2016).
Figure 7.4 World Bank Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Global
Governance Indicator 2011-2017
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Figure 7.4 shows that Chinese stability reached a low point of -0.55 in 2015, effectively
breaking what seemed to be an improvement from 2011 to 2014. This coincides with China’s
violation of users’ rights scores reaching their highest levels. This seems to align with
Hypothesis 3. Indeed, as already discussed in the China section, policies aimed at controlling
internet users’ digital rights are often justified by their necessity to maintain national security. In
2017, the World Bank saw a noticeable increase in Chinese stability of +0.25 from the previous
year, almost reaching 2000 levels. This also coincides with a slight improvement in China’s
internet freedom score, seen in Figure 7.3. However, this same trend is not mirrored in Figure 7.1
and thus does not represent an improvement in protecting citizens’ digital rights. Interestingly, in
2000 and 2017, years of relatively higher political stability, more major domestic cyber laws
were passed to restrict citizens’ digital rights than in less stable years (see Table 3.1). Perhaps
these policies were implemented in order to prepare for instability that is expected to come. If so,
the possibility of time lags in both transparency and political stability as they relate to digital
rights must be considered.
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B. Russia
The World Bank indicator in Figure 7.4 shows that Russian stability has varied more on a
yearly basis than China. Figure 7.4 begins during the 2011 parliamentary ballot and 2012
presidential vote in Russia. During this election cycle Russian leaders were anxious about the
internet’s potential for political disruption, particularly following the use of social media as a
catalyst for the events in the Arab Spring (Nocetti,2015). The implementation of the 2012
Foreign Agents Law (see Table 4.1) reflects these concerns about the internet’s potential.
Furthermore, Figure 7.4 shows a noticeable decline in political stability in 2014, most likely
attributed to the beginning of the annexation of Crimea. The ongoing conflict with the West over
Ukraine provided justification for a further repressive internet agenda which included the
implementation of two major domestic cyber policies (see Table 4.1; Nocetty, 2015).
These events coincide with a marked increase in Russia’s internet freedom and violations
of users’ rights scores in 2014, the former of which has since steadily continued to increase while
the latter peaked in 2016 and 2017. Rural and urban protests since 2013 can also account for the
worsening in political stability throughout these years and resulted in further crackdowns on
digital rights. Figure 7.4 shows slight improvement in Russia’s political stability in 2016 and
more noticeably in 2017, possibly due to a marginal economic improvement that seemed to
foreshadow an end to the recession was in sight (Holodny, 2017). Concurrently, Figure 7.1
shows a peak in Russia’s violation of users’ rights score in these two years, indirectly refuting
Hypothesis 4 which predicted times of stability would see policies that protect digital rights.
Hypothesis 3 seems to hold some truth in that Russia, as a less stable country, violates users’
digital rights in order to protect national security, specifically naming extremism as justification.
C. United States
According to Feng (1997), it is expected that as a democracy the United States would be
more politically stable than the non-democracies of China and Russia. This is confirmed in
Figure 7.4 where even at its least stable in this given time period, the United States’ political
stability and absence of violence/terrorism governance score remains consistently positive. Even
at its lowest point of 0.3 in 2016, the United States was far more stable than both China and
Russia in the same year, which ironically was their most stable year.
Although not seen in Figure 7.4, according to the World Bank’s political stability and
absence of violence/terrorism ranking indicator, the United States was most stable in 2000.17
Between 2002 and 2005, the United States experienced its most political instability most likely
due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the beginning of the wars with Iraq and Afghanistan.
Although Freedom House was not publishing reports during these years, Table 5.1 shows that
three major domestic cyber policies were implemented during these years. These policies allow
for the direct violation of digital rights and act as the foundation for future policies to further
harm digital rights.
Figure 7.4 shows that between 2011 and 2015 the United States’ stability remained
relatively consistent, varying at most by 0.1. These scores coincide with the United States’
violation of users’ rights scores sharply increasing from 2011 to 2013, and then more slowly
from 2013 to 2015 (see Figure 7.1). Once again, in years of relatively higher stability the United
17

Data has been collected since in 1996.
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States drafted laws, or extended older laws, that negatively impact digital rights. As already
discussed in the transparency analysis, the upsurge seen in Figure 7.1 for the United States in
2013 is not the result of sudden increase in policies but rather the public only just becoming
aware of such policies already existing.
A similar logic helps to explain the decrease in violations in users’ rights score in 2016.
The violation of users’ rights 2016 score coincides with a drop in political stability in 2016,
which is most likely due to the 2016 presidential elections. The simultaneous drop in political
stability and slight drop in violation of users’ rights could both be attributed to Russian offensive
cyber operations on the 2016 presidential election (McKew, 2018). The fact that the 2016 drop in
political stability did not return to 2015 levels in 2017 is then a result of growing political unrest
and protests and is mirrored by the return to a slight increase of higher violation of users’ rights
scores. The data concerning the United States seems to align with both Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Regarding Hypothesis 3, the relative political instability between 2001 and 2004 witnessed the
implementation of domestic cyber policies that curtailed citizens’ digital rights in order to protect
national security from further terrorism. As a whole, Hypothesis 4 is supported by how the
United States retains high levels of political stability and does have policies and laws in place to
protect digital rights, starting from its constitution to state laws protecting privacy and net
neutrality.
D. Germany
Once again, Feng would attribute Germany’s stability to its democratic governance. Yet,
over the years Germany’s stability has teetered. Although not available in Figure 7.4, Germany’s
highest level of political stability since 2002 was in 2006 after Chancellor Merkel assumed office
in 2005. During this time of high political stability, an important piece of legislation was passed
to improve transparency (see Table 6.1). Between 2006 and 2012 the Germany’s World Bank
political stability governance score steadily declined, possibly as a result of Merkel’s party
lacking an outright majority and needing a political coalition to govern (World Bank, 2019).
Before noticeably improving in 2013, Germany passed another legislation to defend journalists’
freedom of information and by proxy digital rights. Despite an improvement in stability in 2013,
Figure 7.1 shows that Germany’s violation of users’ rights score increased within the same year,
possibly due to greater awareness of surveillance technologies in Germany.
Stability takes another hit in Germany following an influx of refugees starting in 2015.
The refugee crisis in Germany enflamed social tensions and resulted in various laws and
regulations (see Table 6.1) to curb online hate speech, fake news, and harmful content (Freedom
House, 2018b). This is reflected in the increase in Germany’s violation of users’ rights scores
beginning in 2016. Political instability remained an issue in 2017, particularly due to the
proliferation of disinformation leading up to the federal elections in September (Freedom House,
2018b). The emergence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the slow collapse of the Social
Democrats (SPD) have also contributed to the disruption of Germany’s political stability in the
last two years. The lack of an outright majority to form a government by one political party
undoubtedly contributes to Germany’s recent political stability scores (Conley, 2018).
Despite this, Germany’s violation of users’ rights score in 2018 did not increase. In fact,
new legislation from the European Union is helping to counter Germany’s domestic cyber
policies that may infringe on digital rights. Unlike the previous three cases studies, when
Germany’s political stability is relatively higher, it has not proactively implemented policies that
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violate digital rights. Instead, it partially affirmed Hypothesis 4 and implemented policies, that
originated at the regional level, to protect digital rights. Perhaps this is due to its involvement in
the European Union and its more robust protection of human rights through additional human
rights conventions. As a leader in the European Union, Germany must also act as a role model,
therefore it must be more careful, or secretive, about protecting digital rights particularly in times
of stability. Germany does seem to confirm Hypothesis 3 because in times of lower political
instability it enacted various policies that interfered in their citizens’ digital rights in order to
maintain public order.
E. Key Findings
By analyzing each case study’s political stability and treatment of digital rights over the
years it seems that there is some merit to their hypothesized relationship. For the ease of the
reader, those hypotheses were: H3 states with low levels of political stability are more likely to
interfere in their citizens’ digital rights through policies that are claimed necessary to protect
national security, and H4 states with high levels of political stability are more likely to implement
policies to protect their citizens’ digital rights.
Generally speaking, states with less political stability do tend to violate their citizens’
digital rights more than more politically stable states, and always with the excuse that it is
necessary to protect national security. However, national security can reference different
concerns depending on the state. In the case of China and the United States, protecting national
security meant protecting against terrorism. For Germany and Russia, it meant protecting against
extremist speech. For the former extremist speech means hate speech and for the latter it equates
to speech that threatens Russian elites or the government. In the United States and Germany,
where political stability levels are higher, when stability falters policies were implemented that
harm digital rights, but not always. When Germany faced a steady decline of political stability
from 2006 to 2012, instead of implementing policies that violate digital rights, some policies
were implemented to guarantee more protection of them. Although this may have been seen as
well at the state level in the United States, it was not witnessed nationally. This difference, as
previously discussed, may be a result of the influence of the European Union which holds
Germany more accountable. Conversely, the United States does not have an equally influential
regional body that could affect its domestic policies. Additionally, the United States is a greater
power than Germany and as such does not feel as obligated to abide by the rules and guidelines
of international bodies. As states with relatively lower political stability given their regime type,
the implementation of policies that harm digital rights in Russia and China confirm Hypothesis
3. Furthermore, in times of even lower political stability, China cracked down further on digital
rights.
The affirmation of Hypothesis 4 is less clear. At the surface-level more politically stable
states have more policies that protect digital rights. This can be seen in both the United States
and Germany. Yet, this does not hold true when looking within each case study. For nondemocratic states, this Hypothesis is refuted. Figures 7.1 and 7.4 show that despite a dramatic
improvement in political stability in China in 2017, China’s violation of users’ rights score
remains at the highest possible level, indicating no correlating improvement. Similarly, Russia’s
rise in political stability in 2017 is met with no improvement of the treatment of digital rights.
This can be interpreted as the governments’ attempts to reinforce their rule. Similarly, for the
democratic case studies Hypothesis 4 is also debunked. Between 2011 and 2015, the United
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States experienced high levels of political stability, yet during this time implemented secretly and
overtly policies that infringe on digital rights. When experiencing high levels of political stability
in Germany, however, regional policies like the GDPR were implemented, but not at the national
level.
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Conclusion
This thesis demonstrates that the view a country takes on digital rights can sometimes be
predicted by its signatory statuses on the ICCPR and ICESCR. China, Russia, and Germany all
ratified the ICESCR. Consequently, they all have particularly robust laws aiming to protect
children’s rights (Article 10 of ICESCR). As discussed in these states’ individual sections, they
all have cited the protection of children’s rights, which are affected by dissemination of child
pornography, as reasons for implementing online constraints. Interestingly, the United States,
which has signed but not ratified the ICESCR, has often signed laws protecting against child
pornography only to later nullify them on the grounds that they are unconstitutional.18 The
United States remains the laxest of the four case studies in regards to children’s rights in relation
to the internet. Often children’s rights take a backseat to freedom of expression in the United
States, which is a reflection of the United States’ hierarchy of human rights where ICCPR rights
come before those found in the ICESCR. As a state that signed and ratified both the ICCPR and
ICESCR, a similar debate often occurs in Germany with mixed results.19 Although Russia also
ratified both human rights conventions, the same issue is not seen, at least not as noticeably,
most likely due to the asymmetric power of the state over society which allows it to largely
ignore public criticisms.
From the early conception of the internet, even prior to its commercialization globally in
the 1990s, scholars and governments were already concerned with its impact on human rights.
The right to privacy was among the earliest concerns to be addressed by laws and charters and
remains a high concern. The scope of human rights that are affected by the use of the internet
and digital technologies continues to expand, thus drawing concern about their protection from
human rights organizations. Most recently, the implementation of the Social Credit System in
China exemplifies the emergence of a new digital right: the freedom of movement. As an active
trailblazer for oppression of digital rights, the further violation of this right can be expected by
other states taking note from China. Although not yet publicly seen, the right to belong to a
country may also be affected in the near future due to the increasing conflicts posed by differing
stances on internet sovereignty lines as a result of the expansion of internet policies and
infrastructures. A state’s stance on internet sovereignty seems to follow its IR theoretical
perspective on state sovereignty. China takes a constructivist realist approach where country
borders determine both state and internet sovereignty, yet China’s expansion of internet
infrastructure and censorship training camps suggest an approach to disseminate their own
norms. Russia views internet sovereignty and state sovereignty with a strict realist lens. In both
cases, China and Russia advocate for complete control of their domestic policies and ignore
international criticisms. The United States and Germany both adhere to neoliberal policies in
regard to internet sovereignty, but perhaps Germany more so due to its involvement in the
18

The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 is one such example. The Supreme Court struck down this
act in 2002 because it was found too broad and thus violated the First Amendment (Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 2002).
19 The Access Impediment Act of 2006 was an attempt to contain the dissemination of pornography but was
repealed due to violation of freedom of expression. Similar debates are occurring again with the enactment of
the 2018 NetzDG law.
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European Union. Germany, through proxy of the EU, is constructivist through its use of
expanding its internet sovereignty in order to influence other states to accept its digital norms.
Thus while China and Germany both hold stances with potential constructivist implications, they
value very different norms. Diverging perspectives on internet sovereignty are likely to become
an increasingly present issue and requires further research.
Aside from the already well-established rights, the development of policies and practices
regarding the internet and other digital technologies has the potential to birth new rights. The
first case of this comes from the European Union: the right to be forgotten. Such a right cannot
be directly equated with pre-existing rights but falls closely within the concepts of right to
privacy and freedom of expression. For reasons discussed above, it can be predicted that this
right is more likely to take hold in states that have ratified the ICCPR. As technologies,
particularly artificial intelligence, continue to advance further digital rights can be expected to
emerge and will undoubtedly give rise to more ethical and legal concerns. Therefore, digital
rights must be afforded particular attention in both states and international organizations. The
case of the right to be forgotten is of particular interest because its timeline and success or failure
will determine the feasibility of a regional body disseminating a digital norm. However,
international organizations should not be complacent and wait. Instead, a proactive approach is
needed to first create an international convention for digital rights. Within said convention, the
question of whether internet access should be considered a human right must be formally
addressed.
The types of policies enacted, and treatment of digital rights is largely affected by
government type. The comparative analysis section of this essay posed and determined the
validity of four hypotheses. The greatest insights to emerge from these hypotheses were; (1) a
correlation between political stability and treatment of digital rights does exist, and (2) a
correlation between transparency and treatment of digital rights is inconclusive, but an apparent
correlation between government type and digital rights does exist. The latter insight prompted
further analysis of all of the Freedom House Freedom of the Net reports between 2011 and 2018.
The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 8.1. The trend lines suggest a clearly possible
correlation between regime type and treatment of digital rights. The more democratic a state is,
the less violations of users’ rights are observed while the opposite is true the more authoritarian a
state is. Figure 8.1 also shows a new insight; with the exception of full democracies, every
regime type’s treatment of digital rights has been worsening since 2013. The only reason full
democracies do not demonstrate this trend is because of the United Kingdom’s 2018 violation of
users’ rights score which acted as an outlier. For that reason, the dashed line represents the data
of all full democracies excluding the United Kingdom. With this updated line, all regime types
show a consistent worsening of the treatment of digital rights. This is a concerning trend that if
not addressed through international conventions might continue.
Incorporating internet access into such a convention will likely cause factions among
states split along government regimes types. Based on the information presented in this thesis, it
could be predicted that full democracies and flawed democracies would be advocates of such a
right. Conversely, hybrid and authoritarian regimes will be opposed. Perhaps decentralized or
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fragmented legal approaches will be necessary to develop the initial treaties with the hope that
digital rights norms subsequently will cascade.
Figure 8.1 Average Violation of Users’ Rights Scores According to Regime Type 2011-2018
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Moreover, the validation of the apparent correlation between regime type and digital
rights has an impact on other avenues of research, including: the use of the internet for
democratization, the dissemination of digital norms in various types of regimes, and the
categorization of what digital rights are at risk based on regime type. By categorizing treatment
of digital rights by regime type it may be possible to anticipate the evolution of a state’s digital
rights hierarchy. Based off the information provided in this thesis, emerging and established
20

Not all countries had data reported for all years. This was taken into account when calculating averages for
each year.
21 Germany and 5 other countries are represented within the full democracy line. The United States and 18
other counties are represented within the flawed democracy line. Both Russia and China along with 21 other
countries are represented within the authoritarian regime line. The hybrid regime line consists of 16 countries.
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democracies tend to place freedom of expression and privacy over most other rights, except
when in times of relative political instability. Democracies facing political instability will
increase policies restricting online freedoms of expression in order to curb political
disinformation and hate speech. Similarly, during times of instability due to acts of
violence/terrorism, democracies are far more likely to enact surveillance policies that violate
individuals’ right to privacy.
Figure 8.1 shows that hybrid regimes’ treatments of digital rights are currently worsening
at the fastest rate. One possible explanation could be the success of authoritarian regimes to
instill some form of political stability with higher levels of online constraints. A characteristic of
hybrid regimes is instability (Menocal, Fritz, and Rakner, 2008). Therefore, these states may be
more inclined to implement harsher internet policies after witnessing their success in
authoritarian states. Current challenges to liberal democracies and democratization may dictate
whether the digital rights norms related to democratic regimes or authoritarian regimes spread.
Yet, the rise of digital authoritarianism22 shows that some rights are equally at risk regardless of
regime type. The most notable example is the right to privacy which is systematically
undermined by the use of mass surveillance in both democracies and authoritarian regimes.
This research demonstrates the prevailing relationship between digital rights and regimes
type. This relationship has important implications considering the reliance of the internet in the
intensification and progress of globalization in the Global South. Despite no single prevalent
regime type in the Global South, most of the states in this category recognize the necessity of
globalization for economic growth and development. To the extent that globalization is linked to
free movement of goods, capital, and ideas, there could perhaps be a preference to maximize
digital rights to gain these benefits. As such, connecting to the internet may be a priority in the
years to come.23 During this transition to a globally connected world the types of policies to be
implemented and subsequently the treatment of digital rights in these states may be predicted by
the regime type. The future of digital rights as a norm could follow two trajectories when put in
the context of the findings of this research. First, as the Global South goes online the
dissemination of what digital rights norms will cascade depends on the regime types of the states
in this category. The digital rights norms to prevail in this trajectory are dependent upon which
type of regime has the most practitioners. Second, the acceptance of internet sovereignty over
territorial sovereignty in cyberspace will give states that do not subscribe to the realist view of
sovereignty an edge in disseminating their digital rights norms. This can be exemplified by the
extension of digital rights norms by the European Union and Germany beyond their territory.
Yet, perhaps more important than the above-stated factors are the expected demographic
and generational shift that may affect societal, and eventually states, attitudes toward digital
rights. Younger generations and the generations to come depend upon the digital world and
globalization, more so than older generations. As a result, younger cohorts might feel less of a
22

Term coined in Freedom on the Net report 2018 (Shahbaz, 2018).
Indeed, the African Union, with the support of the World Bank Group, aims to have every individual,
business, and government in Africa connected to the internet by 2030 in order to lay the foundations for a
digital economy (World Bank Group, 2019).
23
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blind loyalty to their state, particularly due to a greater awareness of the practices of individual
rights in other states. It could then logically follow that younger generations may support norms
that treat digital rights, especially the right to internet access, as a derogable human right. While
most globalized states are facing the issue of an aging population, parts of the Global South—
namely Africa—have the highest percentage of youth populations (World Atlas, 2019).
Therefore, as Africa becomes increasingly more connected and younger generations that grew up
with the internet replace older generations around the world it could be the case that greater
support for a movement toward a norm of digital rights might emerge. The beginnings of such a
movement are already evident in the expansion of the scope of digital rights in charters and
conventions. Therefore, although this research shows that regime type effects the treatment of
digital rights and thus the conception of digital rights as human rights, technological and
demographic change has the potential to alter the specific nature of global practices.
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